Medium frequency cycles in a stationary world.

Tom Holden¹, School of Economics, University of Surrey 22 October 2016

Abstract: Existing models of endogenous growth generate implausibly large trend breaks in output when augmented with standard business cycle shocks. This paper presents a model without this deficiency, yet still capable of generating large medium-frequency fluctuations around the trend. Ensuring the robustness of the trend requires that we eliminate the strong scale effects and knife edge assumptions that plague most growth models. In our model, medium-frequency fluctuations arise from changes in the proportion of industries producing patent protected products. However, variations in the number of firms within each industry ensure that process improvement incentives remain roughly constant. An estimated version of the model matches well the observed pattern of medium frequency cycles.

Keywords: medium frequency cycles, patent protection, scale effects

JEL Classification: E32, E37, L16, O31, O33, O34

Figure 1: The logarithm of U.S. real GDP per capita, 1869-2015.

1 Contact address: School of Economics, FBEL, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, England
Contact email: thomas.holden@gmail.com Web-site: http://www.tholden.org/

The author would like to thank the participants in numerous seminars at which versions of this paper were presented. Further special thanks are due to the following individuals for helpful discussions: Guido Ascarì, Eric Bartelsman, Paul Beaudry, Beatriz de Blas, Cristiano Cantore, Diego Comin, Ana-Maria Dumitru, Martin Ellison, Fabio Ghironi, Bart Hobijn, Tim Kehoe, Paul Levine, Simon Wren-Lewis, Omar Licandro, Ioana Moldovan, Peter Neary, Joaquim Oliveira Martins, Christopher Nekarda, Walter Park, Pietro Peretto, Manuel Santos, Diego Restuccia and Klaus Wälde. Financial support provided to the author by the ESRC and EC is also greatly appreciated. Furthermore, the author gratefully acknowledges the use of the University of Surrey FASS cluster for the numerical computations performed in this paper, and the use of data from the Nuffield College Data Library.

² Real GDP from (a) Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online (HSUS), (Carter et al. 2006), 1869-2002, and, (b) BEA NIPA tables, with “Intellectual Property Products” (IPP) removed from output via inverting the Fisher Index formula, in line with HSUS (and old BEA practices), 1929-2015. Population (including armed forces overseas), from (a) HSUS, 1869-2000, and (b) the FRED series POP, choosing the July value each year in line with HSUS, 1952-2015. In both cases, we linearly interpolate from (a) to (b) over the full period of overlap. The start date of 1869 was chosen as prior to this point the HSUS data is generated via interpolation.
Figure 1, showing the trend in U.S. real GDP per capita, is surely familiar to everyone in the discipline. Despite this, it remains puzzling. As may be seen, a trend fitted to the post-WW2 period also fits well pre-WW1. Indeed, as far back as 1871 real GDP per capita is essentially on the post-WW2 trend. That neither the Great Depression nor two World Wars should have knocked GDP per capita off its log-linear trend is either a spectacular coincidence, or a hint to the deep properties of the mechanisms behind long-run growth for the world’s technological leader. This is all the more remarkable when considered in light of the structural changes taking place elsewhere in the economy, not least the increase in female labour force participation, and the shift from agriculture to manufacturing to services.

Figure 1 also makes clear the size and persistence of the fluctuations around the long-run growth trend. Even if one puts aside the Great Depression and the war economy years, many of the cycles visible have periods of over ten years, and magnitudes of over 10%. These are not the traditional business cycles. Indeed, these cycles are at frequencies that would be swept into the trend by standard trend/cycle filters. Instead, these are the medium-frequency cycles which Comin and Gertler (2006) did so much to bring to the attention of the profession.

However, traditional models of stochastic endogenous growth struggle to generate large medium-frequency fluctuations that nonetheless eventually return to trend. Indeed, generating robustly log-linear growth is even a challenge in non-stochastic models, with knife-edge restrictions apparently inescapable if counter-factual strong scale effects of population on growth rates are to be removed. In this paper, we produce a novel model of stochastic endogenous growth that solves both problems. It generates both robustly exponential long-run growth, without knife-edge assumptions, and large medium-frequency cycles around that long-run trend.

In fact, the solutions to both problems are closely related. If a model only generates exponential growth via a knife-edge assumption (including the assumption of precisely exponential population growth), then standard business cycle shocks will inevitably knock the model away from perfectly counter-balancing the scale effect, leading to a permanent break in the trend of the GDP. For example, in models in which the scale effect is removed via new product creation exactly matching population growth, a temporary shock to population will produce a break in trend GDP unless products can be invented implausibly quickly.

Our chief novelty on the endogenous growth side is allowing for a varying number of firms within each industry. Following the recent endogenous growth literature, our model features both product and process innovation, but it is this third margin of firm entry and exit that proves crucial for generating robustly exponential growth. In an important paper, Li (2000) showed that previous models of dual margin endogenous growth do not generate exponential growth once asymmetric spill-overs between product and process innovation are allowed for. We allow for such asymmetric spillovers, but are still able to get asymptotically exponential growth for a positive measure of parameters, thanks to this additional margin.

Within this structure, we are able to generate large medium-frequency fluctuations as follows. In our model, the returns to inventing a new product are higher in a boom due to the higher demand. As a result, during periods of expansion, the rate of creation of new products increases, in line with the evidence of Broda and Weinstein (2010). Due to a first mover advantage, patent protection, or reverse-engineering difficulties,
the inventors of these new products will be able to extract rents from them, increasing the costs manufacturing firms face if they wish to produce the new product. These higher costs lead to lower competition in new industries, increasing mark-ups and thus increasing firms’ incentives to perform the R&D necessary to catch-up with and surpass the frontier, for basically Schumpeterian reasons. Consequently, the higher proportion of industries that are relatively new in a boom will lead to higher aggregate productivity, lower dispersion of both productivity levels and growth rates, as well as higher mark-ups. This increase in productivity will lead with some lag to an increase in output. Since the length of time for which inventors can extract rents will be determined by the effective duration of patent-protection, these effects will naturally work at medium frequencies. However, since we allow both for the creation of new industries (producing new products) and for varying numbers of firms within each industry, even in the short-run the demand faced by any given firm will be roughly constant, meaning that our model will always return to near the old log-linear trend.

Our endogenous growth model’s rich dynamics mean that we can bring a greater range of evidence to support it compared to that standard in the traditional endogenous growth literature. Early evidence on the low variance of output per capita at frequency zero was presented by Cochrane (1988), and in section 1.1 we present compelling new evidence of the stationarity of U.S. real GDP per capita. While real GDP per capita may not be stationary in other countries, this is to be expected given that such countries are still behind the world technological frontier. Evidence for the pro-cyclicality of TFP has been presented by Bils (1998) and Campbell (1998) amongst others, with Comin and Gertler (2006) showing that the evidence is particularly clear at medium-frequencies. The counter-cyclicality of productivity dispersion has been shown by Kehrig (2011), with evidence on the counter-cyclicality of the dispersion of productivity growth rates provided by e.g. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Bachmann and Bayer (2009). Evidence for mark-up increases leading output at business-cycle frequencies has been presented by Nekarda and Ramey (2010), and in section 1.2 we show that this continues to hold at medium ones. Additionally, Boulhol (2007) shows that although aggregate mark-ups are weakly pro-cyclical, the mark-ups in any particular industry tend to be counter-cyclical. This apparent contradiction is readily explained by our model, as the increase in competition in any particular industry during a boom will lead to a decline in mark-ups in that industry (much as in the models of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) and Jaimovich (2007)), despite the fact that aggregate mark-ups have increased due to the greater proportion of industries with relatively high mark-ups.

Direct evidence for the importance of our mechanism comes from a number of sources. Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) find that firms holding patents have 17% higher TFP levels on average, and additionally find that firms that go from not holding a patent to holding one experience a 7.4% increase in a fixed effects measure of productivity, suggesting that industries producing patent-protected products are indeed significantly more productive. Serrano (2007) finds that although aggregate patenting is only weakly correlated with aggregate TFP, a measure of the number of patents whose ownership is transferred is strongly related to productivity. He argues that there is a great deal of noise in measures of total patent activity, since so many patents are never seriously commercialised. Patent transfers are usually observed though when their purchaser intends to begin exactly such a commercialisation. Thus, patent transfers provide a proxy for the commencement of production of new patented-products, one that is found to be highly pro-cyclical. Additionally, Raymond et al. (2015) present evidence that R&D leads to product innovation, which itself leads to increased productivity, with the increase in productivity much more
persistent than the increase in innovation. Finally, in section 1.3 we present new evidence that longer patent protection significantly increases the share of GDP variance attributable to cycles of medium frequency, suggesting that patent protection plays an important role in the mechanism generating medium frequency cycles in reality.

Previous papers have introduced endogenous productivity improvement into business cycle models (e.g. Comin and Gertler (2006), Comin (2009), Comin, Gertler, and Santacreu (2009), Phillips and Wrase (2006), Nuño (2008; 2009; 2011)), or looked at cycles in growth models (e.g. Bental and Peled (1996), Matsuyama (1999), Wälde (2005), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008; 2009), Comin and Mulani (2009)). However, all of these papers have problems with scale effects, either in the long run, or in the short run following standard shocks, and thus all of them would predict counter-factually large trend breaks in output in the presence of standard business cycle shocks. Furthermore, it is not obvious how these scale effects could be removed without destroying the papers’ mechanisms for generating aggregate TFP movements. For example, the papers of Wälde (2005) and Phillips and Wrase (2006) rely on there being a small finite number of sectors. Removing the scale effect would mean allowing this number to grow over time with population, meaning the variance of productivity would rapidly go to zero. Indeed, this happens endogenously in the model of Horii (2011). Many models of endogenous mark-up determination (e.g. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) or Jaimovich (2007)) have a similar problem, with the presence of a small finite number of industries being crucial for explaining the observed variance of mark-ups. Indeed, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2011) write that “reconciling an endogenous time-varying markup with stylized growth facts (that imply constant markups and profit shares in the long run) is a challenge to growth theory”. By disentangling the margins of firm entry and product creation, we will be able to answer this challenge.

The paper of most relevance to our work is that of Comin and Gertler (2006), who made the important contribution of bringing the significance of medium-frequency cycles to the attention of the profession. Additionally, their theoretical model, like ours, stresses the links between mark-up variation and productivity growth. Unfortunately, however, it is a model with strong scale effects removed via knife-edge assumptions, with the inevitable consequence that the driving mark-up shock produces a counter-factual trend break in productivity. Furthermore, beyond this trend break, the model generates little endogenous persistence, and also counter-factually predict that increases in mark-ups lead to falls in output, contrary to the empirical evidence of Nekarda and Ramey (2010). While there is room to disagree with the recent empirical work on the cyclicity of output, the fact that mark-up increases lead output increases is much more robustly established. We conclude that the literature still lacks a model of productivity capable of explaining both its short run and its long run behaviour.

In this paper, we present a model capable of doing exactly this. In order to robustly remove scale effects, as discussed above it will feature a varying number of industries, each of which will contain a varying number of firms. We do not wish to make any exogenous assumptions on the differences between industries

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4 The social value of the aggregate capital stock enters in multiple places without exponent, in order to capture the idea that “operating costs are proportional to the sophistication of the economy”. Had (say) frontier technology been used in its place, the generated impulse responses would likely have been quite different, and had it entered with a non-unit exponent then the model would not have possessed a balanced growth path.

5 Care must be taken to match measures of the aggregate mark-up. If we measure the aggregate mark-up by the inverse labour share, then holding labour supply and output constant, an increase in wage mark-ups decreases aggregate mark-ups. However, at reasonable calibrations of the Comin and Gertler (2006) model, an increase in wage mark-ups results in such a drop in labour supply that the inverse labour share increases.

6 See footnote 14 for a discussion of the evidence on whether this correlation is causal.
producing patented products versus those producing unpatented ones, so in order to match the medium-frequency behaviour of productivity and mark-ups it is important that our model allow endogenous variation in these quantities across industries. Were we to assume free transfer of technologies across industries there would be too little difference in productivity between patent-protected and un-patent-protected industries, and hence we would not be able to generate medium-frequency cycles. Equally, were we to assume technology transfer across industries was impossible, then it would be legitimate to inquire whether the difference between these industry types was implausibly large, as perhaps firms in non-protected industries would find it optimal to perform technology transfer even if they did not find it optimal to perform any research. Consequently, in modelling the endogenous productivity in each industry we will allow firms both to perform research, and to perform a costly process of catch-up to the frontier we shall term appropriation.

To make clear the strength of the amplification and persistence mechanism presented here, we start by illustrating the mechanism in a small model without capital. The core of the model is set out in section 2, and we discuss the model’s qualitative behaviour in section 3. We then go on to embed our mechanism within a richer RBC model, which we proceed to empirically test via structural estimation in section 4.

1. Reduced form evidence

1.1. The trend stationarity of U.S. real GDP per capita

We begin by presenting evidence that real GDP per capita is stationary. This may be counter to the received wisdom, but that “wisdom” was largely born of using unit root tests with low power, on short, quarterly data series. We fix the latter problem by using annual data back to 1869, the data at which the Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online (HSUS) data (Carter et al. 2006) becomes reliable. (Prior to this it is interpolated from data at sub-annual frequency.) This longer data span provides more information about the model’s low frequency behaviour, also helping increase power. To further increase power, we use the bootstrap version (Chang, Sickles, and Song 2016) of Hansen’s covariate augmented unit root test (Hansen 1995). This test is based on a test of the null hypothesis that $\alpha = 0$ in a regression of the form:

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha y_{t-1} + \sum_{k=1}^{l} \rho_k \Delta y_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{m} \phi_k \Delta z_{t-k} + \epsilon_t,$$

where $y_t$ is linearly-detrended log U.S. real GDP per capita, and $z_t$ is a linearly-detrended covariate with $\Delta z_t$ stationary. If $\alpha$ is significantly negative (under its non-standard distribution), then we may conclude that $y_t$ is stationary.

As a covariate, we use real GDP per capita in a variety of other countries. To ensure that data is consistent across countries, we download all countries data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). The U.S. historical data provided by this project is derived from the HSUS data previously mentioned. In all cases, the foreign real GDP per capita is verified to have a stationary growth rate as required using a conventional ADF test (Said and Dickey 1984). For both the bootstrap procedure, and the test itself, we choose $l, m \in \{0,1,2\}$ using the AICc criterion (Sugiura 1978; Hurvich and Tsai 1989). To remedy any biases caused by this lag selection, we bootstrap the original bootstrap test, i.e. we double bootstrap. The bootstrap residuals are leverage-adjusted using the standard formula (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon 2006). We use 10,000
samples for each layer of the bootstrap, making for a total of 100,000,000 inner bootstrap samples per test. Results are reported in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate is log real GDP per capita in:</th>
<th>First observation</th>
<th>Last observation</th>
<th>Single bootstrapped p-value</th>
<th>Double bootstrapped p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0088**</td>
<td>0.0069**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0101*</td>
<td>0.0092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0100*</td>
<td>0.0102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0356*</td>
<td>0.0317*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe9</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0116*</td>
<td>0.0123*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Results of the double bootstrapped covariate augmented unit root test of the null hypothesis that U.S. real GDP per capita has a unit root.

From Table 1, we see that with the logarithm of either Canada or Australia’s real GDP per capita as the covariate, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the logarithm of U.S. real GDP per capita at a 1% significance level. Given that both are spacious “new world” nations it is unsurprising that their common history with the U.S. provides useful additional information. Since the p-value of a combination of tests must be weakly below all of the individual p-values, Table 1 means that the probability of obtaining results as extreme as this were there a unit root must be below 0.69%. The fact that all five covariates lead to a rejection of the null of a unit root at a 5% significance level suggests that the true probability may be much lower. Taken together then, these results provide compelling evidence of stationarity. If after all there is a random walk component to U.S. log real GDP, the variance of the innovation associated with the random walk must be tiny.

Of course, we might not be able to attain such results for other countries, but this is no contradiction with the story we present here. Our model implies that we should only expect stationary growth in countries that are at the technological frontier, in which productivity growth is being driven by novel R&D, rather than by transferring technologies. We are also unlikely to observe stationary growth if the country has undergone major political or economic changes that have permanently changed the country’s productivity. The country also needs to be large enough that the closed economy approximation is reasonable. Given this, it is perhaps only in the U.S. that we should expect to see stationary output.

1.2.  Mark-ups

Nekarda and Ramey (2010) found that mark-ups were pro-cyclical both when the data was filtered with a standard ($\lambda = 1600$) HP-filter, and when it was filtered by taking first differences. However, Comin and Gertler (2006) report that mark-ups are counter-cyclical when the data is filtered via a band pass filter that keeps cycles of periods from one to fifty years. Given that Comin and Gertler find that the medium-frequency variance of output is concentrated on cycles taking around ten years, the natural question is whether the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups they observe is a consequence of behaviour around these

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7 This gives the time index in the first $\Delta y_t$ on the left-hand side. Since $\Delta y_{t-2}$ may appear on the right-hand side, observations from three years prior to this may be used. This does mean that the 1867 and 1868 observations of U.S. real GDP per capita could be used when the first observation is 1871, if $l > 0$, but on balance we view the risk of using some slightly less reliable data on the right-hand side as minimal, given that $\Delta y_t$ has low persistence.
8 The last observation is the last in the data-set in all cases.
9 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, (Centre-North) Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.
10 Using annual data, they also find that mark-ups are counter-cyclical at business cycle frequencies, though less so than at medium ones; however, Nekarda and Ramey find that the use of annual data always biases observed correlations towards counter-cyclical.
frequencies, or whether it is driven by counter-cyclicality at lower frequencies. Nekarda and Ramey (2010) also found that at business cycle frequencies, mark-ups were strongly correlated with future output, and negatively correlated with past output. Again, we would like to know if this still holds at plausible medium frequencies. The plot in Figure 2 below answers both questions.

Each vertical slice of this plot shows the cross-correlation\(^\text{11}\) of quarterly log output and log mark-ups\(^\text{12}\) when both are filtered by a symmetric high pass filter\(^\text{13}\) with a cut-off given by the x-axis’s value. (Hatched areas indicate positive correlations, with the cross-hatched area being significantly different from zero at 5%. The dotted area is negative but insignificantly different from zero at 5%.) We see immediately that Nekarda and Ramey’s finding that mark-ups are positively correlated with future output and negatively correlated with past output holds particularly strongly at medium frequencies.\(^\text{14}\)

![Figure 2: The cross correlation of U.S. output and mark-ups, as a function of filter cut-off.](image)

However, from tracing along the lead=0 line we see that the evidence on the contemporaneous cyclicality of mark-ups is ambiguous at medium-frequencies. While mark-ups are unambiguously pro-cyclical when

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\(^{11}\) Fractional lags are evaluated via linear interpolation.

\(^{12}\) Mark-ups are measured by the inverse labour share (following Nekarda and Ramey (2010)). Data is from NIPA, 1947:Q1-2016Q2. In calculating the labour share, we assume that both proprietors’ income and the statistical discrepancy have identical labour share to the rest of the economy.

\(^{13}\) Implemented by setting the lower cut-off of a symmetric Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter to two quarters.

\(^{14}\) Given these two apparent directions of causation, it is tempting to try to explain away one as merely a product of the cyclical behaviour of the variables concerned. (Recessions inevitably follow expansions, which inevitably follow recessions, etc.) Along these lines, Tutino and Cheremukhin (2012) argue that only the negative association between output and the leads of mark-ups is indicative of a causal connection, backing this up with evidence of Granger (1969) causality from output to mark-ups, but not in the reverse direction. Unfortunately, given the relatively large amount of (near-) idiosyncratic noise in mark-ups, Granger causality tests are unlikely to be reliable. Indeed, we show in the online appendix section 7.8 that the presence of idiosyncratic noise in mark-ups can lead Granger causality to go in the opposite direction to the true flow of information in the model, particularly when the two variables have such tight cyclic associations. In our model, there is certainly the possibility of bi-directional information flow, due to both the cross-industry and within-industry composition effects, although the former will tend to dominate. Given the aforementioned problems with Granger causality tests, reduced-form empirical work is little use in deciding between our story and that of Tutino and Cheremukhin (2012).
the data is filtered to keep only the highest frequencies, and mark-ups are unambiguously counter-cyclical when low frequencies are included, at medium frequencies (e.g. cycles of 8 to 16 years), the contemporaneous correlation is insignificant. Thus, it is much more important that our model can generate a strong channel linking high current mark-ups and high future output, than whether it generates particularly pro- or counter-cyclical mark-ups.

1.3. GDP variance

Our model predicts that the length of patent-protection should be positively correlated with the observed size of medium-frequency cycles, at least for durations of patent-protection around those we observe in reality. In Table 2, we exploit cross-country variation in effective patent duration to demonstrate the presence of this correlation in the data, even when we control for GDP, legal origins and various measures of political stability and risk.\textsuperscript{15} Across all of these specifications, both initial patent duration and the increase in patent duration over the sample are positively associated with the proportion of variance at medium frequencies, with both having significant effects at a 5% level in all but the specification with no controls. In our preferred specification with the full set of controls, both variables have an effect that is significant at a 1% level. Concerns about residual endogeneity mean some restraint must be exerted in interpreting these results, but they are nonetheless suggestive of a key role for patent protection in the mechanism generating medium frequency cycles in the data.

\textsuperscript{15} Full details of the data are given in footnotes to the table.
is the number of observations used in constructing the dependent variable, and where all coefficients are constrained to be positive. This specification nests unweighted, population weighted, and number of observation weighted regression. Estimation is by iterated feasible generalised least squares.

on the West German data, and a 20% weight on the East German data. Observations outside of this window were constructed by constant extrapolation. Pre-unification German data was constructed from an 80% weight World Tables data. In all cases, the number of observations comes is insignificant if it is added to the regression.

Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter set to accept cycles from 2 to 50 years. For all countries, we use the maximum possible time span from the Penn World Tables data. In all cases, the number of observations comes is insignificant if it is added to the regression.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Spec. 1</th>
<th>Spec. 2</th>
<th>Spec. 3</th>
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<th>Spec. 5</th>
<th>Spec. 6</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Mean$^{25}$ log real GDP (output side)</td>
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<td>0.1968**</td>
<td>0.1914**</td>
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<td>-0.0889</td>
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<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.2303</td>
<td>-0.2876*</td>
<td>-0.3182*</td>
<td>-0.3856**</td>
<td>-0.4366***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park (2008)</td>
<td>Slope$^{26}$ patent duration index</td>
<td>25.4341</td>
<td>33.9635*</td>
<td>38.5254*</td>
<td>48.1122**</td>
<td>45.1931*</td>
<td>49.9016**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial$^{27}$ patent duration index</td>
<td>0.6849*</td>
<td>0.8356*</td>
<td>1.0083**</td>
<td>1.2423***</td>
<td>1.1498**</td>
<td>1.2882**</td>
<td>0.9650**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations$^{21}$</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum normality test p-value$^{22}$</td>
<td>0.0672</td>
<td>0.2139</td>
<td>0.4542</td>
<td>&gt;0.5</td>
<td>&gt;0.5</td>
<td>0.4300</td>
<td>0.4851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The impact of patent duration on the strength of medium frequency cycles.

Coefficients from assorted regression$^{23}$ specifications. (Stars denote significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1%.)

In all cases, the dependent variable is a logit transform of the proportion of real GDP per capita$^{24}$ growth variance that is at frequencies with periods greater than eight years$^{25}$.

$^{16}$ All means and slopes are over the period for which RGDPNA growth is available, which is the period used in constructing the dependent variable.

$^{17}$ All initial values are the first period for which RGDPNA growth is available, which is the first period used in constructing the dependent variable.

$^{18}$ International Country Risk Guide, The PRS Group. Data provided by the Nuffield College Data Library. Original provided data was 1984-2007. Observations outside of this window were constructed by constant extrapolation. Pre-unification German data was constructed from an 80% weight on the West German data, and a 20% weight on the East German data.

$^{19}$ All countries without German, Scandinavian, Socialist or British legal origins have French legal origins.

$^{20}$ Data from Park (2008) kindly provided by Walter Park, updated from Cinarte and Park (1997). Original provided data was 1960-2005, with observations every 5 years. Annual data was created by linearly interpolating between observations, with constant extrapolation outside of the original window.

$^{21}$ We used the maximal subset of countries for which all regressors were available.

$^{22}$ The minimum of the p-values from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors test, all of which have normality as null.

$^{23}$ We use a model for the variance of the form $\sigma_i^2 = \sigma_0 + \frac{\sigma_1}{\text{NUMOBS}} + \nu_i$, where POP, is mean$^{26}$ population from the Penn World Tables, NUMOBS, is the number of observations used in constructing the dependent variable, and where all coefficients are constrained to be positive. This specification nests unweighted, population weighted, and number of observation weighted regression. Estimation is by iterated feasible generalised least squares.

$^{24}$ Using national accounts data. This is RGDPNA in the Penn World Tables.

$^{25}$ Medium frequency variance shares are constructed by taking the ratio of the variance of real GDP per capita when filtered with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter set to accept cycles from 9 to 50 years, to the variance of real GDP per capita when filtered with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter set to accept cycles from 2 to 50 years. For all countries, we use the maximum possible time span from the Penn World Tables data. In all cases, the number of observations comes is insignificant if it is added to the regression.
2. **The core model**

We begin by describing the core of both the simple and the richer models. This takes the form of a sector producing perishable “widgets”. In the simple model, these widgets will be the sole input to the production of the final good, whereas in the richer model, these widgets will be combined with labour and capital. For simplicity, the production of widgets will not itself require capital in either model. Although our use of this widget sector is chiefly motivated by expositional brevity, the reader may like to think of the widgets as high-tech goods such as computer chips.

The widget production sector comprises a continuum of narrow industries, each of which contains finitely many firms producing a unique product. The measure of industries is increased by the invention of new products, which start their life patent-protected. However, we assume that product inventors lack the necessary human capital to produce their product at scale themselves, and so they must licence out their patent to manufacturing firms. The duration of patent-protection is given by a geometric distribution, in line with Serrano’s (2010) evidence on the large proportion of patents that are allowed to expire early, perhaps because they are challenged in court or perhaps because another new product is a close substitute. An earlier working-paper version of this model (Holden 2011) considered the fixed duration case, which is somewhat less tractable. Allowing for a distribution of protection lengths also allows us to give a broader interpretation to protection within our model. Even in the absence of patent protection, the combination of contractual agreements such as NDAs, and difficulties in reverse engineering, is likely to enable the inventor of a new product to extract rents for a period.

Our model of endogenous competition within each industry is derived from Jaimovich (2007). We chose the Jaimovich model as it is a small departure from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) set-up, and leads to some particularly neat expressions. Similar results could be attained with Cournot competition, or the translog form advocated by Bilbie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012). One important departure from the Jaimovich model is that in our model, entry decisions take place one period in advance. This is natural as we wish to model research as taking place after entry but before production. Productivity within a firm is increased by performing research or appropriation. We regard process research as incremental, with regular small changes rather than the unpredictable jumps found in Schumpetarian models (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Wälde 2005; Phillips and Wrase 2006).

Throughout, we assume that only products are patentable, and so by exerting effort firms are able to “appropriate” process innovations from other industries to aid in the production of their own product. This appropriation is costly since technologies for producing other products will not be directly applicable to producing a firm’s own product. We assume that technology transfer within an industry is costless however, due to intra-industry labour flows and the fact that all firms in an industry are producing the same product. This is important for preserving the tractability of the model, as it means that without loss of generality we may think of all firms as just existing for two periods, in the first of which they enter and perform research, and in the second of which they produce.

26 This is broadly in line with the law in most developed countries: ideas that are not embedded in a product (i.e. a machine) generally have at most limited patentability. In the U.S., the most recent Supreme court decision found that the following was “a useful and important clue” to the patentability of processes (Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___ (2010)): “a method claim is surely patentable subject matter if (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing” (In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). This “machine or transformation” test was widely believed at the time to have ended the patentability of business processes (The Associated Press 2008), and this position was only slightly softened by Bilski v. Kappos.
The broad timing of our model is as follows. At the beginning of period $t$ invention takes place, creating new industries. All holders of current patents (including these new inventors) then decide what level of licence fee to charge. Then, based on these licence fees and the level of overhead costs, firms choose whether to enter each industry. Next, firms perform appropriation, raising their next-period productivity towards that of the frontier, then research, further improving their productivity next period. In period $t+1$, they then produce using their newly improved production process. Meanwhile, a new batch of firms will be starting this cycle again.

We now give the detailed structure of the widget production sector.

### 2.1. Aggregators

The aggregate “widget” good is produced by a perfectly competitive industry from the aggregated output $X_t(i)$ of each industry $i \in \mathbb{I}_{t-1} \subset \mathbb{R}$, using the following Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Ethier 1982) style technology:

$$
X_t = |\mathbb{I}_{t-1}| \left[ \frac{1}{|\mathbb{I}_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in \mathbb{I}_{t-1}} \frac{X_t(i)^{1+\lambda}}{1+\lambda} di \right]^{1+\lambda}
$$

where $\frac{1+\lambda}{\lambda}$ is the elasticity of substitution between goods and where the exponent on the measure of industries ($|\mathbb{I}_{t-1}|$)\(^{27}\) has been chosen to remove any preference for variety in consumption.\(^{28}\) We normalize the price of the aggregate widget good to 1.

Similarly, each industry aggregate good $X_t(i)$ is produced by a perfectly competitive industry from the intermediate goods $X_t(i,j)$ for $j \in \{1, \ldots, J_{t-1}(i)\}$\(^{29}\), using the technology:

$$
X_t(i) = J_{t-1}(i) \left[ \frac{1}{J_{t-1}(i)} \sum_{j=1}^{J_{t-1}(i)} X_t(i,j)^{1+\eta\lambda} \right]^{1+\eta\lambda}
$$

where $\eta \in (0,1)$ controls the degree of differentiation between firms, relative to that between industries.

### 2.2. Intermediate firms

#### 2.2.1. Pricing

Firm $j$ in industry $i$ has access to the linear production technology $X_t(i,j) = A_t(i,j) L_t^P(i,j)$ for production in period $t$, where $A_t(i,j)$ is their productivity and $L_t^P(i,j)$ is their labour input. As in Jaimovich (2007), strategic profit maximisation then implies that in a symmetric equilibrium, the price of the good in industry $i$ is given by $P_t(i) = (1 + \mu_{t-1}(i)) \frac{W_{t}^{W}}{A_t(i)} = (1 + \mu_{t-1}(i)) \frac{W_{t}^{W}}{A_t(i)}$, where $\mu_t(i) := \lambda \frac{\eta J_t(i)}{J_t(i) - (1-\eta)} \in (\eta\lambda, \lambda]$ is the industry $i$ mark-up in period $t+1$, $W_t^{W}$ is the wage in the widget sector and $A_t(i) = A_t(i,j)$ is the productivity shared by all firms in industry $i$ in symmetric equilibrium. From aggregating across industries,

---

27 The $t-1$ subscript here reflects the fact that industries are invented one period before their product is available to consumers.

28 Incorporating a preference for variety would not change the long-run stability of our model. However, it would introduce counterfactual cointegration between productivity and population, suggesting that in reality the preference for variety is at most very weak. (An OLS regression of annual real GDP per capita from 1840 on population and a trend gives a negative coefficient on population, and reduced rank regression of the bivariate cointegrated VAR gives a positive but insignificant coefficient on population in the cointegrating vector.)

29 Again, the $t-1$ subscript reflects the fact that firms enter one period before production.
we then have that \( W_t^W = \frac{A_t}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \) where

\[
\frac{1}{1+\mu_t} = \left[ \frac{1}{|I_t|} \int_{i \in I_t} \left( \frac{1}{1+\mu_t(i)} \right)^{1/\lambda} di \right]^{\lambda}
\]

determines the aggregate mark-up \( \mu_{t-1} \) and where:

\[
A_t := \left[ \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{A_t(i)}{1+\mu_{t-1}(i)} \right)^{1/\lambda} di \right]^{\lambda}
\]

\[
\left[ \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{1}{1+\mu_{t-1}(i)} \right)^{1/\lambda} di \right]^{\lambda}
\]

is a measure of the aggregate productivity level.\(^{30}\)

2.2.2. Sunk costs: rents, appropriation and research

Following Jaimovich (2007), we assume that the number of firms in an industry is pinned down by the zero profit condition that equates pre-production costs to production period profits. Firms raise equity in order to cover these upfront costs, which come from four sources.

Firstly, firms must pay a fixed operating cost of \( L^F \) units of labour that covers things such as bureaucracy, human resources, facility maintenance, training, advertising, shop set-up and capital installation/creation. Asymptotically, the level of fixed costs will not matter, but including it here will help in our explanation of the importance of patent protection for long run growth.

Secondly, if the product produced by industry \( i \) is currently patent-protected, then firms must pay a rent of \( R_t(i) \) widgets to the patent-holder for the right to produce in their industry. Since all other sunk costs are paid to labour, for convenience we define \( L_t^R(i) := \frac{R_t(i)}{W_t^R} \), i.e. the labour amount equivalent in cost to the rent.

Thirdly, firms will expand labour effort on appropriating the previous process innovations of the leading industry. We define the level of the leading technology within industry \( i \) by \( A_t^*(i) := \max_{j \in \{1, \ldots, J_t(i)\}} A_t(i, j) \) and the level of the best technology anywhere by \( A_t^* := \sup_{i \in I_{t-1}} A_t^*(i) \). Due to free in-industry transfer, even without exerting any appropriation effort, firms in industry \( i \) may start their research from \( A_t^*(i) \) in period \( t \). By employing appropriation workers, a firm may raise this level towards \( A_t^* \).

We write \( A_t^{**}(i, j) \) for the base from which firm \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J_t(i)\} \) will start research in period \( t \). This base is given by the output of the appropriation process, the returns of which we assume to take the form:

\[
A_t^{**}(i, j) = \left[ A_t^*(i)^T + \left( A_t^{**}(i, j)^T - A_t^*(i)^T \right) \frac{L_t^A(i, j)}{1 + L_t^A(i, j)} \right]^{1/\tau}, \tag{1}
\]

where \( \tau > 0 \) controls whether the catch-up amount is a proportion of the technology difference in levels (\( \tau = 1 \)), log-levels (\( \tau = 0 \)) or anything in between or beyond, and where \( L_t^A(i, j) \) is the effective input to appropriation. This in turn is given by \( L_t^A(i, j) := E_t^A(i) L_t^A(i, j) \), where \( L_t^A(i, j) \) is the quantity of labour that the firm devotes to appropriation in period \( t \), and \( E_t^A(i) := \frac{A_t^*(i) - \zeta^{A1} A_t^*}{\zeta^{A2} |I_t|^\phi^A \Psi^A} \), where \( \Psi^A \) is the productivity of appropriation labour, \( \zeta^{A1} > 0 \) controls the extent to which appropriation is getting harder over time due to the increased complexity of later technologies, \( \zeta^{A2} \geq 0 \) gives the strength of the spillover from process innovation to appropriation, and where \( \phi^A \geq 0 \) gives the strength of the spillover from product innovation to process appropriation.

\(^{30}\) Due to the non-linear aggregation, it will not generically be the case that aggregate output is aggregate labour input times \( A_t \). However, the aggregation chosen here is the unique one under which aggregate mark-ups are known one period in advance, as industry mark-ups are.
This specification captures the key idea that the further a firm is behind the frontier, the more productive will be appropriation. Allowing for spillovers from product and process innovation is essential to demonstrate that in our model endogenous growth is not a knife-edge result, unlike in that of Li (2000). Finally, allowing for appropriation (and research, and invention) to get harder over time is both realistic, and essential for the tractability of our model, since it will lead our model to have a finite dimensional state vector asymptotically, despite all the heterogeneity across industries. In order for this to be the case, we assume that $\phi^A$ is small enough that $\left(A^*_t - \xi^A \left| I_t \right| \phi^A \right) \to 0$ as $t \to \infty$, where $\xi^A = \xi^{A1} - \xi^{A2} > 0$. We will derive sufficient conditions on structural parameters for this in section 3.1.

Fourthly, firms will employ labour in research. If firm $j \in \{1, \ldots, J_t(i)\}$ has an effective research input of $L_t^R(i,j)$, then we assume that its productivity level in period $t+1$ will be given by:

$$A_{t+1}(i,j) = A^*_t(i,j) \left(1 + \gamma Z_{t+1}(i,j) L_t^R(i,j) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

where $\gamma > 0$ controls the “parallelizability” of research and $Z_{t+1}(i,j) > 0$ is a stationary stochastic process representing the luck component of research, with $\mathbb{E} Z_t \equiv 1$. If $\gamma = 1$, research may be perfectly parallelized, so arbitrarily large quantities may be performed within a given period without loss of productivity, but if $\gamma$ is large, then, in line with the evidence of Siliverstovs and Kancs (2012), the returns to research decline as the firm attempts to pack more into one period. Much as with appropriation, the effective input to research is given by $L_t^R(i,j) := L_t^R(i) L_t^R(i,j)$, where $L_t^R(i,j)$ is the quantity of labour the firm employs in research in period $t$, and $L_t^R(i) := A^*_t(i) - \xi^{R1} A^*_t \left| I_t \right| \phi^R \Psi^R$, where $\Psi^R$ is the productivity of research labour, $\xi^{R1}$ controls the extent to which research is getting harder over time, $\xi^{R2} \geq 0$ gives the spillover from frontier process innovation and $\phi^R \geq 0$ gives the spillover from product innovation to process. We again assume that $\phi^R$ is small enough that $\left(A^*_t - \xi^R \left| I_t \right| \phi^R \right) \to 0$ as $t \to \infty$, where $\xi^R = \xi^{R1} - \xi^{R2} > 0$. We also assume that $\xi^{R1} > \xi^{A1}$, $\xi^{R2} \leq \xi^{A2}$ and $\phi^R \leq \phi^A$ implying that the difficulty of research is increasing over time faster than the difficulty of appropriation. This is made because research is very much specific to the industry in which it is being conducted, whereas appropriation is a similar task across all industries attempting to appropriate the same technology, and hence is more likely to have been standardised, or to benefit from other positive spillovers.

In the following, for tractability, we will assume that $Z_t(i,j) := Z_t$ so that all firms receive the same “idea” shock. We make this assumption chiefly for simplicity, but it may be justified by appeal to common inputs to private research, such as university research output or the availability of new tools, or by appeal to in-period labour market movements carrying ideas with them. We will see in the following that allowing for industry-specific shocks has minimal impact on our results, providing shocks are bounded above.

2.2.3. \textbf{Research and appropriation effort decisions}

Firms are owned by households and so they choose research and appropriation to maximize:

$$\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Xi_{t+1} \left( P_t(i,j) - \frac{W^W_{t+1}}{Y_{t+1}(i,j)} \right) X_t(i,j) \right] - \left[ L_t^R(i,j) + L_t^A(i,j) + L_t^F(i) + L_t^F \right] W^W_t,$$

where $\beta \mathbb{E}_t$ is the household’s stochastic discount factor from period $t$ to $t + 1$. It may be shown that, for firms in frontier industries (those for which $A_t^*(i) = A^+_t$), if an equilibrium exists, then it is unique and

---

31 Peretto (1999) also looks at research that drives incremental improvements in productivity, and chooses a similar specification. The particular one used here is inspired by Groth, Koch, and Steger (2009).
symmetric within an industry; but we cannot rule out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria more generally.\textsuperscript{32} However, since the coordination requirements of asymmetric equilibria render them somewhat implausible, we restrict ourselves to the unique equilibrium in which all firms within an industry choose the same levels of research and appropriation.

Then, providing \( \frac{1}{\mu_{t}(i)} < \min(\gamma, \tau) \) and \( \gamma > \zeta \) (for the second order conditions\textsuperscript{33} and for uniqueness), combining the first order and free entry conditions then gives us that, in the limit as \( \var Z_{t+1} \to 0 \):\textsuperscript{34}

\[
\mathcal{L}^{R}(i) = \max \left\{ 0, d_{t}(i)E_{t}(i)(L_{t}^{A}(i, j) + L_{t}^{R}(i) + L_{t}^{F}) - \mu_{t}(i) \right\} \frac{\gamma \mu_{t}(i) - d_{t}(i)}{\gamma} \tag{3}
\]

and:

\[
\mathcal{L}^{A}(i) = \max \left\{ 0, -f_{t}(i) + \sqrt{\max\{0, f_{t}(i)^{2} + \varrho_{t}(i)\}} \right\}, \tag{4}
\]

where \( d_{t}(i) \in (0, 1) \)\textsuperscript{35} is small when firm behaviour is highly distorted by firms’ incentives to deviate from choosing the same price as the other firms in their industry, off the equilibrium path (so \( d_{t}(i) \to 1 \) as \( f_{t}(i) \to \infty \)), and \( f_{t}(i) \) and \( g_{t}(i) \) are increasing in an industry’s distance from the frontier,\textsuperscript{36} as the further behind a firm is, the greater are the returns to appropriation.

Equations (3) and (4) mean that research and appropriation levels are increasing in the other sunk costs a firm must pay prior to production, but decreasing in mark-ups. They also mean that the strategic distortions caused by there being a small number of firms within an industry tend to reduce research and appropriation levels. Other sunk costs matter for research levels because when other sunk costs are high, entry into the industry is lower, meaning that each firm receives a greater slice of production-period profits, and so has correspondingly amplified research incentives.

Why mark-up increases decrease research incentives is clearest when those mark-up increases are driven by exogenous decreases in the elasticity of substitution. When products are close substitutes, then by performing research (and cutting its price) a firm may significantly expand its market-share, something that will not happen when the firm’s good is a poor substitute for its rivals. When \( d_{t}(i) \approx 1 \) (i.e. there are a lot of firms in the industry) firms act as if they faced an exogenous elasticity of substitution \( \frac{1+\mu_{t}(i)}{\mu_{t}(i)} \), and so when mark-ups are high they will want to perform little research. When \( d_{t}(i) \) is small (i.e. there are only a few

\textsuperscript{32} The equilibrium concept we use is that of pure-strategy subgame-perfect local Nash equilibria (SPLNE) (i.e. only profitable local deviations are ruled out). We have no reason to believe the equilibrium we find is not in fact a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Indeed, if there is a pure-strategy symmetric SPNE then it will be identical to the unique pure-strategy symmetric SPLNE that we find. Furthermore, our numerical investigations suggest that at least in steady-state, at our calibrated parameters, the equilibrium we describe is indeed an SPNE. (Code available on request.) However, due to the analytic intractability of the second stage pricing game when productivities are asymmetric, we cannot guarantee that it remains an equilibrium away from the steady-state, or for other possible calibrations. However, SPLNE’s are independently plausible since they only require firms to know the demand curve they face in the local vicinity of an equilibrium, which reduces the riskiness of the experimentation they must perform to find this demand curve (Bonanno 1988). It is arguable that the coordination required to sustain asymmetric equilibria and the computational demands of mixed strategy equilibria render either of these less plausible than our SPLNE.

\textsuperscript{33} The second order condition for research may be derived most readily by noting that when \( d_{t}(i) \to 1 \) (i.e. \( f_{t}(i) \to \infty \)) the first order condition for research is identical to the one that would have been derived had there been a continuum of firms in each industry with exogenous elasticity of substitution \( \frac{1+\mu_{t}(i)}{\mu_{t}(i)} \). That it holds more generally follows by continuity and uniqueness. Since \( A_{t}^{*}(i, j) \) is bounded above, no matter how much appropriation is performed the highest solution of the appropriation first order condition must be at least a local maximum.

\textsuperscript{34} The first order and zero profit conditions are reported in the online appendix, section 7.1, where we also derive these solutions. We do not assume \( \sigma_{P} = 0 \) when simulating, but it leads here to expressions that are easier to interpret.

\textsuperscript{35} When \( d_{t}(i) \to 1 \) (i.e. \( f_{t}(i) \to \infty \)) the first order condition for research is identical to the one that would have been derived had there been a continuum of firms in each industry with exogenous elasticity of substitution \( \frac{1+\mu_{t}(i)}{\mu_{t}(i)} \). That it holds more generally follows by continuity and uniqueness. Since \( A_{t}^{*}(i, j) \) is bounded above, no matter how much appropriation is performed the highest solution of the appropriation first order condition must be at least a local maximum.

\textsuperscript{36} The first order and zero profit conditions are reported in the online appendix, section 7.1, where we also derive these solutions. We do not assume \( \sigma_{P} = 0 \) when simulating, but it leads here to expressions that are easier to interpret.
firms\(^{37}\) then firms’ behaviour is distorted by strategic considerations. Each firm realises that if they perform extra research today then their competitors will accept lower mark-ups the next period. This reduces the extent to which research allows market-share expansion, depressing research incentives.

The key thing to note about (3) and (4) is that research and appropriation are independent of the level of demand, except insomuch as demand affects mark-ups or the level of strategic distortion. This is because when demand is high there is greater entry, so each firm still faces roughly the same demand. This is essential for removing the short-run scale effect.

In industries that are no longer patent-protected, rents will be zero (i.e. \(L_t^{R}(i) \equiv 0\)). Since research is getting harder at a faster rate than appropriation (\(\zeta^{R1} > \zeta^{A1}, \zeta^{R2} \leq \zeta^{A2}, \phi^{R} \leq \phi^{A}\)), at least asymptotically, no research will be performed in these industries. This is because \(d_t(i)E_t^{R}(i)[L_t^{A}(i) + L_t^{F}] - \mu_t(i)\) is asymptotically negative as \(\mu_t(i) \in (\eta \lambda, \lambda]\). For growth to continue forever in the absence of patent protection, we would require that the overhead cost \(L_t^{F}\) was growing over time at exactly the right rate to offset the increasing difficulty of research. This does not seem particularly plausible. However, it will turn out that optimal patent rents grow at exactly this rate, so with patent protection we will be able to sustain long run growth even when overhead costs are asymptotically dominated by the costs of research. In the presence of sufficiently severe financial frictions of the “pledgibility constraint” form (Hart and Moore 1994), it may be shown that long run growth is sustainable even without patent protection. We leave the details of this for future work.

2.3. Inventors and patent protection

Each new industry is controlled by an inventor who owns the patent rights to the product the industry produces. Until the inventor’s product goes on sale, they can successfully protect their revenue stream through contractual arrangements, such as non-disclosure agreements. This means that even in the absence of patent-protection, an inventor will receive one period of revenues. They then have a probability of \(1 - q\) of being granted a patent to enable them to extract rents for a second period. After this, if they have a patent at \(t\), then they face a constant probability of \(1 - q\) of having a patent at \(t + 1\).

We suppose, however, that inventors lack the necessary human capital to produce their product at scale themselves. Instead, in the period the product is invented, and in each subsequent period in which they have a patent, the inventor optimally chooses the rent \(R_t(i)\) (or equivalently \(L_t^{R}(i)\)) to charge all the firms that wish to produce their product.

The reader should have a firm such as Apple in mind when thinking about these inventors. Apple has no manufacturing plants and instead maintains its profits by product innovation and tough bargaining with suppliers.

\(^{37}\)The minimum value of \(d_t(i)\) occurs when there is more than one firm in the industry. If there is a single firm in an industry, then, as you would expect, very little research will be performed (because the firm’s only incentive to cut prices comes from competition from other industries, competition which is very weak, since those industries are producing poor substitutes to its own good). However, this drop in research incentives works entirely through the mark-up channel, and \(d_t(i) \rightarrow 1\) as \(f_t(i) \rightarrow 1\). One intuition for this is that there can be no strategic behaviour when there is only a single firm.
2.3.1. Optimal rent decisions

Inventors’ businesses are also owned by households; hence, an inventor’s problem is to choose \(L_{t+s}^R(i)\) for \(s \in \mathbb{N}\) to maximise their expected present value, subject to an enforceability constraint on rents. Their period \(t\) present value is given by:

\[
V_t^I(i) := E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s (1-q)^s \left[ \prod_{k=1}^{s} \mathbb{E}_{t+k} \left( 1 - \delta_{t,t+k} \right) \right] L_{t+s}^R(i) W_{t+s}^W(i),
\]

where \(\delta_{t,t}\) is the rate at which products drop out of the widget aggregator, due to changing tastes, or the invention of replacement products.38 In line with this intuition, we assume that \(\delta_{t,t} = \delta_{t} \left( \frac{|I_t|}{G_I |I_{t-1}|} \right)^\psi \delta_{t,t}\), where \(\psi > 0\) gives the elasticity of product depreciation with respect to product growth, \(G_I\) is the value of \(\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{|I_t|}{|I_{t-1}|}\) in the non-stochastic limit of the model, and \(\delta_{t,t}\) is a stationary stochastic process, with \(\mathbf{E}\delta_{t,t} = 1\). We also assume that the random event of losing patent protection is independent of that of product depreciation, so some (but not all) products will drop out of the aggregator without ever going out of patent protection. We define \(\mathbb{P}_t\) to be the set of patent protected industries. The above logic implies that:

\[
|\mathbb{P}_t| - (1-\delta_{t,t})(1-q)|\mathbb{P}_{t-1}| = |I_t| - (1-\delta_{t,t})|I_{t-1}|.
\]

If the rents charged by a patent-holder go too high, a firm is likely to ignore them completely in the hope that either they will be lucky, and escape having their profits confiscated from them by the courts (since proving patent infringement is often difficult), or that the courts will award damages less than the licence fee. This is plausible since the relevant U.S. statute states that “upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court”.39,40 The established legal definition of a “reasonable royalty” is the outcome of a hypothetical bargaining process that took place immediately before production,41 so patent-holders may just as well undertake precisely this bargaining process before production begins.42

This leads patent-holders to set:

\[
L_t^R(i) = \frac{1-p}{p} \left[ L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) + L_t^F \right],
\]

at least for sufficiently large \(t\), where \(p \in (0,1)\) is the bargaining power of the firm, in the sense of the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The simple form of this expression comes from the fact that a firm’s production period revenues (which is what is being bargained over) are precisely equal to the costs they face prior to production, thanks to the free entry condition. A full description of the legally motivated bargaining process is contained in the online appendix, section 7.3, along with a discussion of some technical complications pertaining to off equilibrium play.

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38 This means that were it not for the invention of new products, there would be a measure \((1-\delta_{t,t})|I_{t-1}|\) of industries producing in period \(t+1\).
40 The reasonable royalty condition is indeed the relevant one for us since our assumption that the patent-holder lacks the necessary human capital to produce at scale themselves means it would be legally debatable if they had truly “lost profits” following an infringement (Pincus 1991).
41 See the online appendix, section 7.3, for evidence supporting this interpretation.
42 In any case, if we allow for idiosyncratic “idea shocks” firms will wish to delay bargaining until this point anyway, since with a bad shock they will be less inclined to accept high rents. Patent-holders also wish to delay till this point because the more sunk costs the firms have already expended before bargaining begins, the greater the size of the “pie” they are bargaining over.
From combining (3) and (5) then, at least for sufficiently large $t$, in the limit as $\text{var} Z_{t+1} \to 0$, we have that:

$$L^R_t(i) = \frac{p_H(i) - d_t(i) E^R_t(i) (L^{A}_t(i) + L^{F}_t)}{d_t(i) - \gamma p_H(i)}.$$  

(6)

For there to be growth in the long run then, we now just require that $d_t(i) > \gamma p_H(i)$, which together with the second order and appropriation uniqueness conditions implies $\gamma < \frac{1}{\mu(i)} < \min(\gamma, \tau)$.\(^{43}\) We see that, once optimal rents are allowed for, research is no longer decreasing in mark-ups within an industry, at least for firms at the frontier. Mathematically, this is because the patent-holder sets rents as such a steeply increasing function of research levels. More intuitively, you may think of the patent-holder as effectively controlling how much research is performed by firms in their industry, and as taking most of the rewards from this research. It is then unsurprising that we reach these Schumpeterian conclusions.\(^{44}\)

### 2.3.2. Invention

We consider invention as a costly process undertaken by inventors until the expected returns from inventing a new product fall to zero. New products appear at the end of the product spectrum, and are contained in the set of products aggregated into the widget good until they are hit with the product depreciation shock. Therefore, the product index $i$ will always refer to the same product, once it has been invented.

There is, however, no reason to think that newly invented products will start with a competitive production process. A newly invented product may be thought of as akin to a prototype: yes, identical prototypes could be produced by the same method, but doing this is highly unlikely to be commercially viable. Instead, there will be rapid investment in improving the product’s production process until it may be produced as efficiently as its rivals can be. In our model, this investment in the production process is performed not by the inventor but by the manufacturers. Prototyping technology has certainly improved over time;\(^{45}\) in light of this, we assume that a new product $i$ is invented with a production process of level $A^*_t(i) = S_t A^*_t$, where $S_t \in (0,1)$ is an exogenous process controlling initial relative productivity. We assume that either $S_t$ is stationary, so prototyping technology is keeping up with frontier productivity, or that $S_t$ has a negative growth rate asymptotically, so firms start progressively further behind over time.

Just as we expect process research to be getting harder over time, as all the obvious process innovations have already been discovered, so too we may expect product invention to be getting harder over time, as all the obvious products have already been invented. In addition, the necessity of actually finding a way to produce a prototype will result in the cost of product invention increasing in $A^*_t(i)$, the initial productivity

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43 If the number of firms in protected industries is growing over time then $d_t(i) \to 1$, so asymptotically these conditions are equivalent.

44 The empirical evidence (Scott 1984, Levin, Cohen, and Mowery 1985; Aghion et al. 2005; Tingvall and Poldahl 2006) suggests that the cross-industry relationship between competition and research takes the form of an inverted-U. Based on the fact that strategic distortions are maximised (i.e. $d_t(i)$ is minimised) when there is a small finite number of firms, one might perhaps hope that this holds in our model too. Unfortunately, the maximum of $\frac{\mu(i)}{\gamma}$ (and hence of research) as a function of $\beta(i)$ may be shown to always occur at some $\beta(i) < 1$. While fractional entry may be a legitimate way of modelling niche products that are never fully commercialised, we prefer to explain the inverted-U in the data with reference to the cross-sectional distribution of industries. New industries will start with a production process behind that of the frontier, and thus firms in them will wish to perform large amounts of appropriation and relatively small amounts of research, since appropriation is a cheaper means of increasing productivity for a firm behind the frontier. In the presence of a luck component to appropriation (not included above, for simplicity) this leads new industries to have the highest degree of productivity dispersion, as older industries remain close to the frontier. As a result of this high productivity dispersion, there will be firms in new industries setting both very high, and very low mark-ups, which, combined with the fact they are performing less research than more mature patent-protected industries, would generate an inverted-U.

45 Examples of recent technologies that have raised the efficiency of prototype production include 3D printing and computer scripting languages such as Python.
level of the process for producing the new product. Finally, following Li (2000), we allow for spillovers from process innovation to product innovation. As a result of these considerations, we assume that the labour cost is given by $\mathcal{L}_t I E_t I$, where $\mathcal{L}_t I$ is a stationary stochastic process determining the difficulty of invention, with $\Pr(\mathcal{L}_t I > \mathcal{L}_I) \equiv 1$ and $\mathbb{E}\mathcal{L}_t I \equiv \mathcal{L}_I > \mathcal{L}_I$, and where $E_t I := (S_t A_t^I)^{\zeta I} A_t^I \xi I | I_{t-1} | | I^*, \; \text{with} \; \zeta I > 0$ giving the strength of spillovers from process innovation and $\phi I > 0$ and $\zeta I > \zeta I$ controlling the rate at which inventing a new product gets more difficult because of, respectively, an increased number of existing products or an increased level of initial productivity.

The entry and exit of products is limited by two factors. Firstly, products cannot be uninvented, and secondly, thanks to free entry, there cannot be positive returns to entering. Combining these with incentive compatibility gives the following complementary slackness type condition:

$$\min\left\{ \left| P_t \right| - (1-\delta_{t,I}) \left| P_{t-1} \right|, \mathcal{L}_t I E_t I W_t W - V_t I (sup I_t) \right\} = 0.$$  

When the $|P_t| \geq (1-\delta_{t,I}) |P_{t-1}|$ constraint binds, then the measure of firms will have to adjust instead, meaning there could be an asymmetry in the response of mark-ups to certain shocks.

### 2.3.3. The life cycle of an industry

![Figure 3: The stylized life cycle of an industry](image)

We are now close to being able to describe the life cycle of an industry in our model. Industries start out with productivity behind that of the frontier, but thanks to the high cost of entry to patent-protected industries, they have strong incentives to catch up to it via appropriation. Once they reach it, thanks to the rents charged by patent holders they will perform research pushing the frontier forward over time. Now, some industries will be hit with the “product-depreciation” shock prior to going out of patent protection, but others will fall out of patent protection first. We have already shown that these industries will not perform research asymptotically, so it just remains to be seen if they will perform appropriation.

Appropriation is performed in an industry $i$ if and only if $g_t(i) > 0$, which, for a non-patent protected industry no longer performing research, is true if and only if:

$$\frac{A_t^I(i)}{A_t^*} < \left( \frac{E_t^A(i) L^F}{E_t^A(i) L^F + \tau \mu_t(i) d_t(i)} \right)^{\frac{1}{T}}.$$  

The left hand side of this equation is the relative productivity of the industry compared to the frontier, so industries that are too close to the frontier will not perform appropriation. The right hand side of this equation will be shrinking over time thanks to the increasing difficulty of appropriation, meaning the no-appropriation cut-off point is also declining over time. Indeed, we show in the online appendix, section 7.2,
that asymptotically the productivity of non-protected firms is growing at \(1 + \frac{\bar{\phi} A_2}{\tau} \)\([1 + \frac{\bar{\phi} A_1}{\tau}]^{-1} < 1\) times the growth rate of the frontier, plus \(\frac{\bar{\phi}}{\tau} [1 + \frac{\bar{\phi} A_1}{\tau}]^{-1}\) times the growth rate of the measure of industries. We go on to show that given our previous assumptions, asymptotically this quantity must be strictly lower than the growth rate of the frontier, and hence the relative productivity of non-protected industries is tending to zero asymptotically. This is empirically plausible since productivity differences across industries have been steadily increasing over time,\(^{46}\) and it is important for the tractability of our model since it enables us to focus on the asymptotic case in which non-protected firms never perform appropriation. It is also in line with the long delays in the diffusion of technology found by Mansfield (1993) amongst others.

Armed with this knowledge we can depict the full lifecycle of industries from different cohorts. We do this in Figure 3.

### 3. Properties of a simple model

We now embed the core model in a stripped down real business cycle model, and investigate its properties. In this model the consumption good will be produced from widgets one for one, and there will be no capital. Thus, the market clearing condition in final goods markets takes the form \(C_t = X_t\), where as ever, \(C_t\) is consumption. As of the 2013 NIPA revision\(^{47}\), R&D is treated as investment in GDP, so to produce a comparable measure of output we do the same. In our model, total output in units of widgets, \(Y_t^W\) is equal to expenditure on consumption, research, appropriation and invention, which is:

\[
Y_t^W = C_t + \left[ \frac{L_t^1}{E_t^1} \left( |P_t| - (1 - q)(1 - \delta_{t,t})|P_{t-1}| \right) + \int_{i \in I_t} \left( L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) \right) f_t(i) \, di \right] W_t^W.
\]

To complete the model, we assume there is a unit mass of households, each of which contains \(N_t\) members in period \(t\), where \(N_t\) is a stochastic process governing population. The representative household chooses consumption \(C_t\) and labour supply \(L_t^S\) to maximise:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s N_{t+s} \left[ \log \frac{C_{t+s}}{N_{t+s}} - \frac{1}{1 + \nu} \left( \frac{L_{t+s}^S}{N_{t+s}} \right)^{1+\nu} \right]
\]

(where \(\beta\) is the discount rate and \(\nu\) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply to wages), subject to the aggregate budget constraint that \(C_t + B_t = L_t^S W_t^W + B_{t-1} R_{t-1} + \Pi_t\), where \(B_t\) is the aggregate number of (zero net supply) bonds bought by households in period \(t\), \(R_{t-1}\) is the period \(t-1\) sale price of a (unit cost) bond bought in period \(t-1\), and \(\Pi_t\) is the households’ period \(t\) dividend income. Consequently, the stochastic discount factor is given by \(\beta \Xi_t = \beta \frac{N_{t+1}}{N_{t-1}} C_t\).

The model is closed with the labour market clearing condition:

\[
L_t^S = \frac{L_t^1}{E_t^1} \left[ |P_t| - (1 - q)(1 - \delta_{t,t})|P_{t-1}| \right] + \int_{i \in I_t} \left( L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) + L_t^F \right) f_t(i) \, di \\
W_t^W \left[ L_{t-1}^1 \right] \int_{i \in I_{t-1}} \frac{1}{A_t(i)} \left( \frac{A_t(i)}{1 + \mu_{t-1}(i)} \right)^{1+\lambda} \, di.
\]

---

46 Some indirect evidence for this is provided by the increase in wage inequality, documented in e.g. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008). Further evidence is provided by the much higher productivity growth rates experienced in manufacturing, compared to those in services (mostly unpatented and unpatentable), documented in e.g. Duarte and Restuccia (2009).

3.1. Theoretical long run properties

It may be shown from the free entry conditions for firms and inventors that asymptotically, the amount of labour devoted to invention or research is growing at the same rate as the amount of labour devoted to production. Consequently, from the labour first order condition and labour market clearing one, \( g_X = g_{A^*} + g_N \), where \( g_U \) is the asymptotic growth rate of the variable \( \ell_t \) in the non-stochastic limit. Hence, again from the free entry conditions for firms and inventors:

\[
\frac{g_B}{g} = \frac{1}{1 + \phi_I}(g_X - g_{Wt} - \zeta^I g_{A^*} - \zeta^II g_S) = \frac{1}{1 + \phi_I}(g_N - \zeta^I g_{A^*} - \zeta^II g_S),
\]

where \( \zeta^I := \zeta^{II} - \zeta^{II} > 0 \). Therefore, if \( \phi_I = \zeta^{II} = \zeta^{II} = 0 \) the stock of products will grow at exactly the same rate as population, and away from this special case it may be growing either more slowly or more quickly, since \( g_S \leq 0 \). If invention were to stop asymptotically, eventually there would be no protected industries, and hence no productivity growth. Therefore, for long-run growth, we require that \( g_B > \log(1 - \delta_I) \), i.e. \( g_N - \zeta^{II} g_S - (1 + \phi_I) \log(1 - \delta_I) > \zeta^I g_{A^*} \) which will hold providing product depreciation is sufficiently high, regardless of whether or not there is population growth. Even without product depreciation, productivity growth may be sustained indefinitely in the presence of a declining population if the government offers infinitely renewable patent-protection.

The previous result on the growth rate of the stock of products implies that:

\[
g_I = \frac{\phi_I + \phi_R}{1 + \phi_I} (g_X - g_{Wt}) + \frac{1 - \phi_R}{1 + \phi_I} (\zeta^I g_{A^*} + \zeta^II g_S) - \zeta^R g_{A^*}.
\]

The existence of a solution for our model, at all time periods, requires the number of firms in a protected industry to be bounded below asymptotically. From the previous expression for \( g_I \), it is sufficient that

\[
\frac{\zeta^R g_{A^*}}{1 + \phi_I} \zeta^II g_S \leq \frac{\phi_I + \phi_R}{1 + \phi_I} g_N + \frac{1 - \phi_R}{1 + \phi_I} \zeta^I g_{A^*}
\]

for this to hold. As long as this inequality is satisfied, it may also be shown that there always exists \( \ell^L > 0 \) such that for \( \ell^L \geq \ell^L \) with probability 1, \( J_t(i) \geq 2 \) for all \( t \) and all \( i \in I_t \).

Assuming that the number of firms in a protected industry is indeed bounded below asymptotically, we show in the online appendix, section 7.4, that providing the growth rate of the productivity of newly invented products is sufficiently close to the frontier growth rate (i.e. \( S_t \) does not decline too quickly\(^{48} \)), asymptotically catch-up to the frontier is instantaneous in protected industries, and the frontier growth rate is stationary. This instantaneous catch-up to the frontier means that, had we allowed for industry-specific shocks, all other protected industries would “inherit” the best industry shock, the period after it arrived. This justifies our focus on aggregate “idea” shocks. Additionally, instantaneous catch-up to the frontier means that at least asymptotically, long-run growth may be sustained even in the absence of patent-protection (i.e. when \( q = 1 \), as the one period in which the inventor has a first mover advantage is sufficient for their industry to surpass the existing frontier.

We summarise all the conditions previously assumed or derived in the proposition below. Since \( g_{A^*} \) is endogenous, we now replace \( g_{A^*} \) in the previous inequalities with its bounds in terms of structural

\(^{48} \)A sufficient condition is that \( g_S > \frac{\zeta^I - \zeta^{II}}{2\zeta^{II} g_{A^*}} \). So in the limit as \( \zeta^A \to 0 \) it is sufficient that \( S_t \) is declining at less than half the rate that \( A^*_t \) is growing.
parameters. In particular, we use the fact that from (2), (6), the results of the online appendix, section 7.4, and the inequalities on \( d_t(i) \) derived in the online appendix, section 7.1, as long as \( I_t(i) \geq 2 \) asymptotically:

\[
\frac{\rho \eta \lambda}{1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda} < -\frac{1}{\gamma} \log (1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda) < g_{A^*} \leq -\frac{1}{\gamma} \log \left(1 - \frac{3}{2} \gamma \rho \lambda\right) < \frac{3}{2} \rho \lambda.
\]

### 3.1.1. Proposition 1

Suppose that:

- \( \mathcal{L}_I \geq \mathcal{L}_I \gamma > \mathcal{R}_1 \gamma > \mathcal{A}_1 \), \( \phi_R \leq \phi_A < 1 \), \( \mathcal{E}_I = \mathcal{R}_1 - \mathcal{R}_2 > 0 \), \( \mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}_1 - \mathcal{A}_2 > 0 \),
- \( \mathcal{E}_I = \mathcal{E}_1 - \mathcal{E}_2 > 0 \), \( (1 - \phi^R) \mathcal{E}_I \geq (1 + \phi^I) \mathcal{E}_A \mathcal{R} \frac{1}{1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda} < \min(\gamma, \tau), \gamma \rho \lambda < \frac{2}{3};
- \( \phi^R \leq \max\left\{ \frac{1}{\mathcal{R}_N}, \mathcal{E}_N - \mathcal{S}_N - \mathcal{E}_I \mathcal{R} \frac{1}{1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda} \right\}, \phi^A \leq \max\left\{ \frac{1}{\mathcal{R}_N}, \mathcal{E}_N - \mathcal{S}_N - \mathcal{E}_I \mathcal{R} \frac{1}{1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda} \right\}, \delta_l > 1 - \exp\left\{ -\frac{1}{1 + \phi^I} \left( \frac{3}{2} \rho \lambda + \mathcal{E}_N \mathcal{S}_N - \mathcal{E}_N \right) \right\}.

Then:

a) With probability 1, for all \( t \) and all \( i \in \mathbb{I}_t \), \( \frac{1}{\mu_t(i)} < \min(\gamma, \tau) \) and \( d_t(i) > \gamma \rho \mu_t(i) \), so the second order and uniqueness conditions are satisfied.

b) With probability 1, \( A_t^* - \mathcal{E}_N \) \( \mathcal{R} \) \( \phi^R \to 0 \) and \( A_t^* - \mathcal{E}_N \) \( \phi^A \to 0 \) as \( t \to \infty \), so the assumptions made in 2.2.2 are satisfied, and research and invention are indeed getting harder over time.

c) With probability 1, \( I_t(i) \geq 2 \) for all \( t \) and all \( i \in \mathbb{I}_t \), so the number of firms in protected industries is indeed bounded below asymptotically.

d) \( \mathcal{S}_N > \log(1 - \delta_l) \), so invention does not stop asymptotically, and consequently neither does research.

e) \( \mathcal{S}_N < \frac{\mathcal{E}_N - \mathcal{E}_A}{2 \mathcal{E}_N - \mathcal{E}_A} S_{A^*} \), so asymptotically catch-up to the frontier is instantaneous in protected industries.

f) Research and appropriation are not performed in non-protected industries asymptotically.

g) The asymptotic growth rate of consumption and output is equal to \( g_N + g_{A^*} \), where \( g_{A^*} > \frac{\rho \lambda}{1 - \gamma \rho \eta \lambda} > 0 \).

Furthermore, the set of parameters satisfying the conditions of this proposition is of strictly positive measure. Hence, the model generates fully endogenous growth, without knife-edge assumptions.

### 3.2. Short and medium run behaviour

We now turn to an examination of the qualitative behaviour of our model over the short to medium run, something we will assess via simulations.

If the number of firms in protected industries were asymptotically infinite, then these simulations would tell us nothing about the consequences of the variations in this number that we might see non-asymptotically. Therefore, it will be helpful if it is additionally the case that this number is finite and stationary asymptotically. To guarantee this will, unfortunately, require a knife-edge assumption, namely that \( \frac{E_t^I (\sup \mathbb{I}_t)}{E_t^I} \) is stationary. However, this assumption should just be viewed as a trick to recover some of the model’s non-asymptotic dynamics, even asymptotically. Unlike with knife-edge growth models whereby relatively slight departures from the special parameter values result in growth that could not possibly explain our observed stable exponential growth, here, away from the knife-edge case we will have slowly decreasing mark-ups,

We assume then that the difficulty of producing a prototype ($S_t$) is such that $E_T^R(\sup I_t) \equiv 1$, since the only time $E_T^R(\sup I_t)$ enters the model’s equations is when multiplied by $L^1$, which is already an arbitrary stationary stochastic process. Under this assumption, as $t \to \infty$ the behaviour of our model tends towards stationarity in the key variables. We simulate this asymptotically stationary model. Asymptotically non-protected industries will perform no research or appropriation, so their entry cost to post-entry industry profits ratio is tending to zero, meaning their number of firms will tend to infinity as $t \to \infty$. This is in line with our motivating intuition that excess entry in non-protected industries kills research and appropriation incentives. Derivations of the limiting aggregate quantities are given in the online appendix section 7.5, and the full set of equations of the detrended model is given in section 7.6 there. The definition of equilibrium here is entirely standard.

It may be shown analytically that the steady state of the complete model may always be solved for by solving a pair of univariate nonlinear equations. While the latter equation is always monotonic, the former may not be. However, numerical experiments suggest that it has at most three solutions, with only one solution remaining when $L^1$ is sufficiently large, i.e. when invention is difficult. Had we chosen a parameterisation in which invention was getting harder over time faster than research, clearly asymptotically we would have ended up in the equilibrium that exists when $L^1$ is large. As a result, when we solve for the steady-state, we always pick the equilibrium which exists for arbitrarily large $L^1$. This happens to be the one with the highest number of firms per industry.50

We fix all of the model’s other parameters, except $L^1$, to the values we estimated in a medium-scale version of the model in section 4. $L^1$ is set such that the number of firms in patent-protected industries in this model is equal to that in the estimated extended model. The full parameterisation is reported in the online appendix section 7.7. We note that $\beta$ is set to 0.96 consistent with an interpretation as an annual model, given our focus on medium and lower frequency phenomena.

In Figure 4 TODO: UPDATE we present the nonlinear perfect foresight impulse responses that result from IID (hence non-persistent) shocks to population growth ($G_{N,t}$) and “ideas” ($Z_t$), in the fully nonlinear model.51 We set the magnitude of the idea shock to 1%, and choose the magnitude of the population shock to give a similar productivity response after 5 years.52 Each graph is given in terms of per cent deviations from the value the variable would have taken had the shock never arrived, and the horizontal axis shows time in years, though this remains a quarterly model.

49 Recall that we require $g_S > -\frac{\beta I^R}{\beta A^R + \phi I^R} g_A$ for long run growth. Hence, under the assumption that $A_t^*-\phi^R S_t^* A_t^R I_t^R$ is stationary we require:

\[ \frac{1}{\phi^R} \left( \xi^* - \frac{1 + \phi^R}{1 - \phi^R} \phi I^R \right) g_A + \phi^R \frac{1 - \phi^R}{1 - \phi^R} g_A < \frac{1}{\phi^R} \left( \xi^* - \frac{1 + \phi^R}{1 - \phi^R} \phi I^R \right) g_A, \] which always holds for sufficiently large $\xi^*$.51

50 When the number of firms per industry is large, mark-ups and strategic distortions are constant. This provides an analytic approximation to the solution with the most firms per industry. We then search in a grid around this point for the last zero.

51 This was performed using Dynare (Adjemian et al. 2011).

52 This required a 0.01% shock to $G_{N,t}$.
The principle mechanism of our paper is illustrated most clearly by the population growth rate shock, shown by a solid line in each graph. (We do not wish to advance population shocks as a key driver of business cycles though, since real rigidities will significantly reduce their impact.) Following a permanent increase in population, demand is permanently higher, so, in the long run, the number of industries must grow to balance this out. Given sufficiently inelastic labour supply, this long run increase in the measure of industries requires a short-run substitution of labour from production to invention, pushing down consumption and pushing up wages, and so moderating the rate at which invention will grow. Consequently, in the short run some of the additional demand is absorbed by fluctuations in the number of firms in each industry. Without this additional margin of adjustment, this shock would have led to a large increase in average firm sizes, with a consequent increase in the frontier growth rate and counter-factually large unit root in output.

Despite the tiny movement in frontier productivity (less than 0.000001%), there is still however a substantial movement in aggregate productivity in the medium-term. Following the shock, more new products are being invented each period, meaning that a greater proportion of industries are relatively new, and so a greater proportion are patent-protected. But because patent-protected industries have such strong incentives to catch-up to the frontier, patent-protected industries are more productive than non-protected ones, so an increase in the proportion of industries that are patent protected means an increase in aggregate productivity. Patent-protected industries also have higher mark-ups due to the cost of paying licence fees, enabling this model to generate pro-cyclical mark-ups. Indeed, since there is so much persistence in productivity coming from patent protection, as in the data, movements in mark-ups lead movements in output, bringing us close to the observed cross correlation even in this toy model. In a richer model, the increase in output will be even more sluggish, weakening the contemporaneous correlation, but strengthening the correlation between mark-ups and leads of output.

Fluctuating invention rates also drive the model’s response to any other shock that might be considered, not least the idea shock, shown by the dashed line in each graph. Initially, an idea shock just increases the productivity of patent-protected industries. This also makes them relatively more profitable, enabling patent holders to extract higher rents, and leading to an increase in invention with a corresponding further increase in aggregate productivity. Over time, patent protected industries fall out of patent-protection, carrying their

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53 Pavlov and Weder (2012) also develop a business cycle model capable of generating pro-cyclical mark-ups, via the changing importance of different types of buyers over the business cycle. The properties of these buyers are exogenous in their model however, whereas the properties of the different types of sellers that drive our results are endogenous.
higher productivity with them, and thus increasing the average productivity of non-protected firms too. Consequently, aggregate productivity slowly rises towards its permanently higher long run level. However, even with this reasonably large research productivity shock (1%), frontier productivity still only rises by less than TODO 0.005%, consistent with very low variance at frequency zero.

4. Medium-frequency cycles in a modern real business cycle framework
TODO WORK IN PROGRESS REMOVED IN THIS VERSION

5. Conclusion

Many have expressed the worry that “the apparent fit of the DSGE model [has] more to do with the inclusion of suitable exogenous driving processes than with the realism of the model structure itself” 54. In this paper, we have demonstrated that if productivity is endogenized through research, appropriation and invention then even a frictionless RBC model is capable of generating rich persistent dynamics from uncorrelated shocks, thanks to fluctuations in the proportion of industries that are producing patent-protected products. Furthermore, this improvement in the model’s propagation mechanism does not come at the expense of implausibly large trend breaks in output following shocks, counter-factual movements in mark-ups, or the use of a growth model that we can reject thanks to the absence of strong scale effects in the data. In all of these respects, then, our model presents a substantial advance on the prior literature. We went on to embed our core model within a modern real business cycle framework, showing that this enables just a few shocks to explain much of the data at both business and medium frequencies.

Our model suggests that a switch to indefinite patent protection would result in significant welfare improvements. Such a switch would both permanently increase the level of aggregate productivity, and substantially lessen its variance and persistence, while only slightly increasing mark-ups and efficiency losses due to research duplication. Indeed, it may be shown that in our model increasing patent protection even slightly increases growth rates, as industry profits are decreasing in aggregate productivity, and so with indefinite patent protection each (protected) industry has fewer firms meaning higher mark-ups and higher research. For similar reasons, increasing product differentiation through (for example) trademark law would increase growth rates in our model, as indeed would increasing patent-holder bargaining power.

However, it is clear that the structure of our model has “stacked-the-deck” in favour of finding a beneficial role for patent protection and monopolistic power. Patents in our model are less broad than in the real world, and they do not hinder future research or invention. One minimal conclusion we can draw on patent protection is that product patents should at least be long enough that by the end of patent protection, production process have reached frontier productivity. In our model, this time goes to zero asymptotically. A less radical policy change might be to grant temporary extensions to patents that would otherwise expire during a recession. We intend to explore the full policy implications of this model in future work.

6. References


7. Online appendices

7.1. The free-entry and first order conditions

When deciding how much research and appropriation to perform, firms realise that if they perform a non-equilibrium amount then in the next period they will have an incentive to set a different mark-up to the other firms in their industry. (The clearest example of this is when we have perfect competition, in which case the most productive firm would want to price just below the second most productive firms’ marginal cost.) It may be seen that in non-symmetric equilibrium the optimal price satisfies:

\[ P_t(i,j) = \frac{W_t}{A_t(i,j)} \left[ 1 + \frac{\eta \lambda}{1 - (1 - \eta) \frac{1}{J_{t-1}(i)} \left( \frac{P_t(i,j)}{P_t(i)} \right)^{-1/\eta}} \right]. \]

Since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium, it is sufficient to approximate this locally around \( P_t(i) = P_t(i,j) \) in order to calculate firms’ research and appropriation incentives. Taking a log-linear approximation of \( \log(P_t(i,j)) \) in \( P_t(i,j) / P_t(i) \) gives us that:

\[ P_t(i,j) \approx \frac{W_t}{A_t(i,j)} \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_{t-1}(i)}{\lambda (1 + \omega_{t-1}(i))} \right) \left( \frac{A_t(i,j)}{A_t(i)} \right)^{-\omega_{t-1}(i)} \]

where \( \omega_t(i) := \frac{J_t(i)(1-\eta)}{(J_t(i)-(1-\eta))^2(1+\mu_t(i))} \) captures the strength of these incentives to deviate from setting the same mark-up as all other firms in their industry. Therefore \( P_t(i) \approx \frac{W_t}{A_t(i)} \left( 1 + \mu_{t-1}(i) \right) \) and \( P_t(i,j) \approx \frac{W_t}{A_t(i,j)} \left( 1 + \mu_{t-1}(i) \right) \left( \frac{A_t(i,j)}{A_t(i)} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_{t-1}(i)}{\lambda (1 + \omega_{t-1}(i))} \right) \) where:

\[ A_t(i) := \left[ \frac{1}{J_{t-1}(i)} \sum_{j=1}^{J_t(i)} A_t(i,j) \right]^{1/(1+\omega_{t-1}(i))} \]

Therefore, up to a first order approximation around the symmetric solution, profits are given by:

\[
\beta \left[ \frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_t| J_t(i)} \right] \left( \frac{1 + \mu_t}{1 + \mu_t(i)} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} E_t \Xi_{t+1} X_{t+1} \left[ \left( \frac{A_t(i,j)}{A_t(i)} \right)^{\omega_{t-1}(i)} \right] - \left[ L_t^R(i,j) + L_t^A(i,j) + L_t^R(i) + L_t^F \right] W_t^W.
\]

Note that if \( J_t(i) > \frac{2\sqrt{3-\sqrt{2}}}{1+2\sqrt{2}} \approx 1.17 \), then \( 1 - \eta \lambda \omega_t(i) > 0 \) (by tedious algebra), so providing there are at least two firms in the industry, this expression is guaranteed to be increasing and concave in \( A_{t+1}(i,j) \).

Let \( m_t^R(i,j) W_t^W \) be the Lagrange multiplier on research’s positivity constraint and \( m_t^A(i,j) W_t^W \) be the Lagrange multiplier on appropriation’s positivity constraint. Then in a symmetric equilibrium, the two first order conditions and the free entry condition (respectively) mean:

\[
\beta \left[ \frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_t| J_t(i)} \right] \frac{\mu_t(i)}{1 + \mu_t(i)} \left( \frac{1 + \mu_t}{1 + \mu_t(i)} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} E_t \Xi_{t+1} X_{t+1} \left( \frac{A_t(i,j)}{A_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{x_t d_t(i)}{\mu_t(i)}} \frac{Z_{t+1} E_t^R(i)}{\mu_t(i) (1 + \gamma Z_{t+1} E_t^R(i) L_t^R(i))} = W_t^W \left( 1 - m_t^R(i) \right)
\]
\[ \beta \frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_t|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_t} \left( \frac{1 + \mu_t(i)}{1 + \mu_t(i)} \right)^2 E_i \Xi_{t+1} X_{t+1} \left( \frac{A_{t+1}(i)}{A_{t+1}} \right)^\tau d_t(i) \frac{1 + (\gamma - \zeta^{R1})Z_{t+1} + E_t^R(i) L_t^R(i)}{1 + \gamma Z_{t+1} E_t^R(i) L_t^R(i)} \]

\[ \frac{1}{\tau} A_t^*(i)^\tau \left( 1 + E_t^A(i) L_t^A(i) \right)^2 = W_t^W \left( 1 - m_t^A(i) \right) \]

\[ \beta \frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_t|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_t} \left( \frac{1 + \mu_t(i)}{1 + \mu_t(i)} \right)^2 E_i \Xi_{t+1} X_{t+1} \left( \frac{A_{t+1}(i)}{A_{t+1}} \right)^\tau = \left[ L_t^R(i,j) + L_t^A(i,j) + L_t^R(i) + L^F \right] W_t^W \]

where:

\[ d_t(i) := 1 - \frac{\omega_t(i)}{1 + \omega_t(i)} \frac{(\lambda - \mu_t(i))(\mu_t(i) - \eta \lambda)}{\lambda(1 - \eta) \mu_t(i)} < 1 \]

and where we have dropped indices on variables which are the same across the industry.

We also have that:

\[ \frac{(\lambda - \mu_t(i))(\mu_t(i) - \eta \lambda)}{\lambda(1 - \eta) \mu_t(i)} \leq \left( 1 - \sqrt{\eta} \right) \left( \sqrt{\eta} - \eta \right) \frac{1 - \sqrt{\eta}}{1 + \sqrt{\eta}} < 1 \]

so \( d_t(i) > 0 \), as \( \omega_t(i) < \frac{1}{\eta} \). In fact, we may derive tighter bounds on \( d_t(i) \). Tedious algebra (available on request) gives that as \( J_t(i) \geq 2 \), \( d_t(i) > \frac{2}{3} \), with equality in the limit as \( \eta \to 0 \) and \( J_t(i) \to 2 \).

That the solution for research when \( Z_{t+1} \equiv 1 \) is given by equation (3) is a trivial consequence of the complementary slackness condition and the facts that \( \frac{1}{\mu_t(i)} < \gamma \) and \( d_t(i) < 1 \). Deriving (4) is less trivial though.

Begin by defining \( k_t(i) := \frac{1 + (\gamma - \zeta^{R1}) L_t^R(i)}{1 + \gamma L_t^R(i)} \), and note that since we are assuming \( \gamma > \zeta^{R1} \geq 0 \), we have that \( 0 < k_t(i) \leq 1 \). Also define:

\[ n_t(i) := \frac{d_t(i) k_t(i)}{\tau \mu_t(i)} E_t^A(i) \left[ \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right] \left[ L_t^R(i) + L_t^R(i) + L^F \right] \geq 0, \]

which is not a function of \( L_t^A(i) \), given \( L_t^R(i) \).

We can then combine the appropriation first order condition with the free entry condition to obtain:

\[ \frac{1}{(1 + L_t^A(i))^2} \left( A_t^*(i)^\tau - \frac{d_t(i) k_t(i)}{\tau \mu_t(i)} \left[ \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right] L_t^A(i) \right] = 1 - m_t^A(i). \]

Since the left hand side is weakly positive, from the dual feasibility condition we know \( m_t^A(i) \in [0,1] \). Now when \( L_t^A(i) = 0 \), this becomes:

\[ n_t(i) = 1 - m_t^A(i), \]

since in this case \( A_t^*(i) = A_t^{*A}(i) \). Therefore when \( L_t^A(i) = 0 \), \( n_t(i) \leq 1 \).

We now prove the converse. Suppose then for a contradiction that \( L_t^A(i) > 0 \), but \( n_t(i) \leq 1 \). By complementary slackness, we must have \( m_t^A(i) = 0 \), hence:

\[ 1 \geq n_t(i) = (1 + L_t^A(i))^2 \left( A_t^{*A}(i)^\tau - \frac{d_t(i) k_t(i)}{\tau \mu_t(i)} \left[ \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right] L_t^A(i) \right) \]

\[ \geq (1 + L_t^A(i))^2 \left( A_t^{*A}(i)^\tau - \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right] L_t^A(i) \]

\[ = (1 + L_t^A(i)) \left[ (1 + L_t^A(i)) + L_t^A(i) \left( \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right) \right] \left( \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^\tau - 1 \right] L_t^A(i), \]

where we have used the facts that \( d_t(i) k_t(i) \leq 1 \) and \( \frac{1}{\mu_t(i)} < \tau \) to derive the second inequality.
Expanding the brackets then gives that:

\[ 1 \geq 1 + 2L_t^A(i) + \left( \frac{A_t^*}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^T L_t^A(i)^2, \]

i.e. that \( 0 \geq 2 + \left( \frac{A_t^*}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^T L_t^A(i) \) which is a contradiction as \( \left( \frac{A_t^*}{A_t^*(i)} \right)^T L_t^A(i) \geq 0. \)

We have proven then that providing \( \frac{1}{\mu_t(i)} < \tau, L_t^A(i) = 0 \) if and only if \( n_t(i) \leq 1 \). It just remains for us to solve for \( L_t^A(i) \) when it is strictly positive. From the above, we have that, in this case:

\[ \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T [n_t(i) - 1] = 2 \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{d_t(i)\ell_t(i)}{\mu_t(i)} \right] \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \right] \right] L_t^A(i) + L_t^A(i)^2. \]

Hence:

\[ L_t^A(i) = - \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{d_t(i)\ell_t(i)}{\mu_t(i)} \right] \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \right] \right] + \sqrt{\left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{d_t(i)\ell_t(i)}{\mu_t(i)} \right] \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \right] \right]^2 + \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T [n_t(i) - 1], \]

since the lower solution is guaranteed to be negative as \( n_t(i) > 1 \) when \( L_t^A(i) > 0. \)

### 7.2. The steady state for non-patent-protected industries

In an industry \( i \) which is not patent-protected and in which appropriation, but no research, is performed, from (1) and (4), we have that:

\[ f_t(i) + \sqrt{f_t(i)^2 + g_t(i)} = L_t^A(i) = \left[ 1 - \frac{\left( A_{t+1}^*(i) \right)^T}{1 - \left( A_t^*(i) \right)^T} \right] L_t^A(i) - 1. \]

If we treat \( p_1 := \tau \frac{\mu_t(i)}{d_t(i)} - 1 \approx 0, p_2 := E_t^A(i)L^F \approx 0 \) and \( p_3 := \left( \frac{A_{t+1}^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T - 1 \approx 0 \) as fixed, this leaves us with a cubic in \( \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \), for which only one solution will be feasible (i.e. strictly less than 1). Taking a second order Taylor approximation of this solution in \( p_1, p_2 \) and \( p_3 \), reveals (after some messy computation), that:

\[ \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \approx p_2(1 - (p_1 + p_2)) = E_t^A(i)L^F \left( 2 - \tau \frac{\mu_t(i)}{d_t(i)} - E_t^A(i)L^F \right) \]

(The effect of \( p_3 \) on \( \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \) is third order and hence it does not appear in this expression.)

From this approximate solution for \( \left( \frac{A_t^*(i)}{A_t^*} \right)^T \) then, we have that the relative productivity of a non-protected industry is decreasing in its mark-up. Furthermore, from dropping to a first order approximation, we have that \( A_t^*(i)^{1+\frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau}} \approx A_t^* \left( \frac{\varphi^A}{\tau} \right)^{1+\frac{\zeta A^2}{\tau}} \left( 1+\frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \), so asymptotically non-protected industries are growing at \( \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^2}{\tau} \right] \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} \) times the growth rate of the frontier, plus \( \frac{\varphi^A}{\tau} \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} \) times the growth rate of the measure of industries.

To examine the long run behaviour of this level of relative productivity, recall that we assumed \( A_t^* - \zeta A^1 \frac{\varphi^A}{\tau} \to 0 \) as \( t \to \infty \), where \( \zeta A^1 = \zeta A^1 - \zeta A^2 > 0. \) Thus if we write \( g_t(i) \) for the asymptotic growth rate of the variable \( \theta \), we have \( \varphi^A g_t(i) < \zeta A^1 g_A^* - \zeta A^2 g_A^* \), so:

\[ g_{A^*(i)} = \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^2}{\tau} \right] \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} g_A^* + \frac{\varphi^A}{\tau} \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A^1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} g_t(i) \]

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\[
< \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A_2}{\tau} \right] \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A_1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} g_{A^*} + \frac{\zeta A_1}{\tau} \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A_1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} g_{A^*} - \frac{\zeta A_2}{\tau} \left[ 1 + \frac{\zeta A_1}{\tau} \right]^{-1} g_{A^*} = g_{A^*}.
\]

7.3. The inventor-firm bargaining process

We model the entire process of setting and paying rents as follows:

1) Firms enter, paying the fixed cost.
2) Firms who have entered conduct appropriation, then research.
3) The “idea shock” for next period’s production, \(Z_{t+1}\), is realised and firms and patent holders learn its level.
4) Finally, firms arrive at the patent-holder to conduct bargaining, with these arrivals taking place sequentially but in a random order. (For example, all firms phone the patent-holder sometime in the week before production is to begin.) In this bargaining we suppose that the patent-holder has greater bargaining power, since they have a longer outlook\(^{55}\) and since they lose nothing if bargaining collapses\(^{56}\).

We also suppose that neither patent-holders nor firms are able to observe or verify either how many (other) firms paid the fixed cost, or what research and appropriation levels they chose. This is plausible because until production begins it is relatively easy to keep such things hidden (for example, by purchasing the licence under a spin-off company), and because it is hard to ascertain ahead of production exactly what product a firm will be producing. We assume bargaining takes an alternating offer form, (Rubinstein 1982) but that it happens arbitrarily quickly (i.e. in the no discounting limit).

5) Firms pay the agreed rents if bargaining was successful. Since this cost is expended before production, we continue to suppose firms have to borrow in the period before production in order to cover it. Firms will treat it as a fixed cost, sunk upon entry, since our unobservability assumptions mean bargaining’s outcome will not be a function of research and appropriation levels.

6) The next period starts, other aggregate shocks are realised and production takes place.

7) The patent-holder brings court cases against any firms who produced but decided not to pay the rent. For simplicity, we assume the court always orders the violating firm to pay damages to the patent-holder, which are given as follows:

a) When the courts believe rents were not reasonable (i.e. \(L_t^R(i) > L_t^{R*}(i)\), where \(L_t^{R*}(i) W_t^W\) is the level courts determine to be “reasonable royalties"), they set damages greater than \(L_t^{R*}(i) W_t^W\), as “the infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid"\(^{57}\). We assume excess damages over \(L_t^{R*}(i) W_t^W\) are less than the patent-holder’s legal costs however.

b) When the courts consider the charged rent to have been reasonable (i.e. \(L_t^R(i) \leq L_t^{R*}(i)\)) the courts award punitive damages of more than \(\max \left\{ L_t^{R*}(i) W_t^W, \left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right) L_t^R(i) W_t^W \right\}\), where \(p\) is the bargaining power of the firm, in the sense of the generalized Nash bargaining solution.\(^{58}\)

\(^{55}\) Consider what happens as the time gap between offers increases. When this gap is large enough only one offer would be made per-period, meaning the patent-holder would make a take-it-or-leave-it offer giving (almost) nothing to the firm, which the firm would then accept.

\(^{56}\) The firm owner may, for example, face restrictions from starting businesses in future if as a result of the bargaining collapse they are unable to repay their creditors.


\(^{58}\) The level \(\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right) L_t^R(i) W_t^W\) is chosen to ensure that, with equilibrium rents, firms prefer not to produce at all rather than to produce without paying rents.
Under this specification:

\[
L_t^R(i) = \min\{L_t^{R^*}(i), (1-p)[L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) + L_t^F(i) + LF]\}
\]

since entry is fixed when bargaining takes place, since patent-holders know that bargaining to a rent level any higher than \(L_t^{R^*}(i)W_t^W\) will just result in them having to pay legal costs,\(^{59}\) and since \([L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) + L_t^F(i) + LF]W_t^W\) is equal to the production period profits of each firm in industry \(i\), by the free entry condition.\(^{60}\) Therefore, in equilibrium:

\[
L_t^R(i) = \min\{L_t^{R^*}(i), L_t^{R^+}(i)\},
\]

where \(L_t^{R^+}(i)\) is a solution to equations (3), (4) and (5), (i.e. \(L_t^R(i) = \frac{1-p}{p}[L_t^R(i) + L_t^A(i) + LF]\) if one exists, or \(+\infty\) otherwise. Because damages are always greater than \(L_t^{R^*}(i)W_t^W\), these rents will be sufficiently low to ensure firms are always prepared to licence the patent at the bargained price in equilibrium.

Now suppose we are out of equilibrium and fewer firms than expected have entered. Since neither the patent-holder nor firms can observe how many firms have entered, and since firms arrive at the patent-holder sequentially, both sides will continue to believe that the equilibrium number of firms has entered and so rents will not adjust. On the other hand, suppose that (out of equilibrium) too many firms enter. When the first unexpected firm arrives at the patent-holder to negotiate, the patent-holder will indeed realise that too many firms have entered. However, since the firm they are bargaining with has no way of knowing this,\(^{61}\) the patent-holder can bargain for the same rents as in equilibrium. Therefore, even out of equilibrium:

\[
L_t^R(i) = \min\{L_t^{R^*}(i), L_t^{R^+}(i)\}
\]

where we stress \(L_t^{R^+}(i)\) is not a function of the decisions any firm happened to take. This ensures that any solution of equation (7) with equations (3) and (4), will also be an equilibrium, even allowing for the additional condition that the derivative of firm profits with respect to the number of firms must be negative at an optimum.

We now just have to pin down “reasonable royalties”, \(L_t^{R^*}(i)W_t^W\)\(^{318}\) \(\text{Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971), cited in Pincus (1991),}\) defines a reasonable royalty as “the amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain the licence to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a licence.”

Certainly it must be the case that \(L_t^{R^*}(i) \leq L_t^R(i)\), where \(L_t^R(i)\) is the level of rents at which \(J_t(i) = 1\), since rents so high that no one is prepared to pay them must fall foul of the courts’ desire to ensure licensees can make a profit.\(^{62}\) However, since when \(J_t(i) = 1\) the sole entering firm (almost) may as well be the patent-
holder themselves, where possible the courts will set $L_t^R(i)$ sufficiently low to ensure that $J_t(i) > 1$ in equilibrium, again following the idea that licensees ought to be able to make a profit. When there is a $J_t(i) > 1$ solution to equations (3), (4) and (5) already (i.e. $L_t^R(i) < \infty$), the courts will just set $L_t^R(i)$ at the rent level that would obtain in that solution, thus preventing the possibility of $J_t(i) = 1$ being an equilibrium. It may be shown that for sufficiently large $t$ such a solution is guaranteed to exist, so in this case $L_t^R(i) = L_t^R(i) = L_t^R(i)$.

7.4. Proof of instantaneous catch-up in frontier industries

Suppose $(i_t)_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a sequence of industries, all protected at $t$, for which the sequence $(A_t^*(i_t))_{t=0}^{\infty}$ grows at rate $\bar{g} \leq g_A^*$ asymptotically. We seek to prove:

(a) that $\lim_{t \to \infty} A_t^*(i_t) = \frac{A_t^*(i_t)}{A_t^*(i_t)} = 0$, and

(b) that the existence of $\epsilon > 0$ such that $A_t^*(i_t) < 1 - \epsilon$ for all sufficiently large $t$ implies $\lim_{t \to \infty} A_t^*(i_t) = \infty$.

First, note that since mark-ups are asymptotically bounded above and below, so too is effective research. Consequently, $\delta_t(i_t)$ is bounded above, so from (4) we know that the asymptotic growth rate of $L_t^A(i_t)$ is equal to that of $\sqrt{g_t(i_t)}$. Hence, if the antecedent of (b) holds, the asymptotic growth rate of $L_t^A(i_t)$ is bounded below by:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ (\xi_R^1 - \xi_A^1)g_t(i_t) + (\xi_A^2 - \xi_R^2)g_A^* + (\phi_A^* - \phi_R^*)g_t(i_t) \right] > 0$$

(as $\xi_R^1 > \xi_A^1, \xi_R^2 \leq \xi_A^2$ and $\phi_R^* \leq \phi_A^*$), which establishes the consequent of (b).

In any case, the asymptotic growth rate of $L_t^A(i_t)$ is less or equal to:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ (\xi_R^1 g_A^* - \xi_A^1) + (\xi_A^2 - \xi_R^2)g_A^* + (\phi_A^* - \phi_R^*)g_t(i_t) \right]$$

Therefore the asymptotic growth rate of $A_t^*(i_t) - \xi_R^1 A_t^*(i_t) \|I_t^R| \phi_R^* P L_A(i_t)$ is less or equal to:

$$-\xi_R^1 g + \xi_A^1 g + \frac{1}{2} \left[ (\xi_R^1 g_A^* - \xi_A^1) - (\xi_A^2 - \xi_R^2)g_A^* - (\phi_A^* - \phi_R^*)g_t(i_t) \right]$$

For (a) to be proven, we then just need that $\frac{\xi_R^1}{2\xi_R^1 - \xi_A^1} g_A^* < \bar{g}$. We require (a) and (b) to hold for any sequence of protected industries. Conditions for this may be derived using the fact that for any such sequence, $g_S + g_A^* \leq \bar{g} \leq g_A^*$. Ensuring that $\frac{\xi_R^1}{2\xi_R^1 - \xi_A^1} g_A^* < \bar{g}$ for any $\bar{g}$ in this interval is equivalent to requiring that $\frac{\xi_R^1}{2\xi_R^1 - \xi_A^1} g_A^* < g_S + g_A^*$. I.e. we require that $-g_S < \frac{\xi_R^1}{2\xi_R^1 - \xi_A^1} g_A^*$. Since the right hand side is strictly positive (as $\xi_R^1 > \xi_A^1$) this holds for a positive measure of values for $g_S$.

7.5. Market clearing and aggregate relationships

Asymptotically, labour market clearing implies:

$$L_t^S = \frac{L_t^A}{E_t^A} \left[ \|P_t| - (1 - q) (1 - \delta_{t,t}) \|P_{t-1} \| \right] + \|P_t \| L_t^{RP} \|_{E_t^{RP}}^P + X_t W_t^{1+\lambda} \left[ \frac{1}{\|I_{t-1} \|} \int_{I_{t-1}} \frac{1}{A_t(i)} \left( A_t(i) \right) \right]^{1+\lambda}$$

where variables with superscript $P$ refer to the value in patent protected industries. Now, if we define the aggregate productivity of non-protected industries for period $t$ production by:

$$L_t^S = \frac{L_t^A}{E_t^A} \left[ \|P_t| - (1 - q) (1 - \delta_{t,t}) \|P_{t-1} \| \right] + \|P_t \| L_t^{RP} \|_{E_t^{RP}}^P + X_t W_t^{1+\lambda} \left[ \frac{1}{\|I_{t-1} \|} \int_{I_{t-1}} \frac{1}{A_t(i)} \left( A_t(i) \right) \right]^{1+\lambda}$$

63 There may still be multiple solutions for rents (as (3), (4) and (5) might have multiple solutions), but of these only the one with minimal entry is really plausible, since this is both weakly Pareto dominant (firms always make zero profits and it may be shown that the patent-holder prefers minimal entry) and less risky for entering firms (if entering firms are unsure if the patent-holder will play the high rent or the low rent equilibrium, they are always better off assuming the high rent one since if that assumption is wrong they make strict profits, whereas had they assumed low rents but rents were in fact high they would make a strict loss).
\[ A_{t-1}^N := \left\lfloor \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}| - |P_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1}} A_t(i) \frac{1}{\lambda} di \right\rfloor ^\lambda = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}| - |P_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1}} A_{t-1}(i) \frac{1}{\lambda} di \right\rfloor ^\lambda, \]

(as non-protected industries have constant productivity), then:

\[
\frac{1}{|I_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1}} \frac{1}{A_t(i)} \left( \frac{A_t(i)}{1 + \mu_{t-1}(i)} \right) \frac{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}}{\lambda} di = \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}|} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \eta \lambda} \int_{i \in I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1}} A_t(i) \frac{1}{\lambda} di + |P_{t-1}| \frac{1}{A_t} \left( \frac{A_t^* \lambda}{1 + \mu_{t-1}^p} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} \right)
\]

so the labour market clearing condition implies:

\[
L^S_t = \frac{L^I_t}{E_t} \left[ |P_t| - (1 - q) (1 - \delta_{t,1}) |P_{t-1}| \right] + |P_t| \left[ \frac{L^P_t}{L^P_{t-1}} \right]^P + X_t W_t W^{-\frac{1 + \lambda}{\lambda}} \left[ \frac{|I_{t-1}| - |P_{t-1}|}{|I_{t-1}|} A_{t-1} \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} + |P_{t-1}| A_t \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_{t-1}^p} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} \right].
\]

Furthermore, since non-protected industries have constant productivity:

\[
A_t^N = \frac{1}{|I_t| - |P_t|} \left( \int_{i \in (I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1}) \setminus (I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1})} A_t^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} di + (1 - \delta_{t,1}) \int_{i \in I_{t-1} \setminus P_{t-1}} A_{t-1}(i) \frac{1}{\lambda} di \right)^\lambda = \left( \frac{|I_t| - |P_t|}{|I_t| - |P_t|} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} + (1 - \delta_{t,1}) \left( \frac{|I_t| - |P_t|}{|I_t| - |P_t|} \right) A_{t-1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \frac{1 + \lambda}{\lambda} \right].
\]

Using \( A_t^N \), we can also simplify the productivity aggregation condition giving:

\[
W_t^W = \frac{1}{|I_{t-1}|} \int_{i \in I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{A_t(i)}{1 + \mu_{t-1}(i)} \right)^\lambda di = \left( \frac{|I_{t-1}| - |P_{t-1}|}{|I_{t-1}|} \right) \left( \frac{A_t^N \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} + |P_{t-1}| A_t \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_{t-1}^p} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} \right).\]

Along similar lines, we have that:

\[
\frac{1}{1 + \mu_t} = \left( \frac{|I_t| - |P_t|}{|I_t|} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}} + \frac{|P_t|}{|I_t|} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_{t-1}^p} \right)^{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda}},
\]

which gives \( A_t \) as \( W_t^W = A_t \frac{1}{1 + \mu_{t-1}}. \)

### 7.6. The de-trended model

Below we give the equations of the stationary model to which the model described in section 3 converges as \( t \to \infty \). As in the previous section, variables with superscript \( P \) refer to the value in patent protected industries.

#### 7.6.1. Households

- **Stochastic discount factor:** \( \Xi_t = \frac{\hat{C}_{t-1}}{C_t G_{A^*,t}} \), where \( \hat{C}_t := \frac{C_t}{N_t A_t} \) is consumption per person in labour supply units and \( G_{\theta,t} = \frac{\theta_t}{\theta_{t-1}} \).

- **Labour supply:** \( \hat{L}^S_{t} = \frac{\hat{W}_t}{C_t} \), where \( \hat{L}^S_t := \frac{L^S_t}{X_t} \) is labour supply per person and \( \hat{W}_t^W := \frac{W_t^W}{A_t} \) is the wage per effective unit of labour supply.

- **Euler equation:** \( \beta R_t E_t[\Xi_{t+1}] = 1 \), where \( R_t \) is the real interest rate.
7.6.2. Aggregate relationships

- **Aggregate mark-up pricing:** \( \hat{W}_t^W = \frac{\hat{A}_t}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \) where \( \mu_{t-1} \) is the aggregate mark-up in period \( t \) and \( \hat{A}_t := \frac{A_t}{A_t^*} \) is aggregate productivity relative to the frontier.

- **Mark-up aggregation:** 
  \[
  \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_t}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} = (1-\sigma_t) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{1+\eta \lambda} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} + \sigma_t \left( 1 + \frac{1+\eta \lambda}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}},
  \]
  where \( \sigma_t := \frac{[I]}{[E]} \) is the proportion of industries that will produce a patent protected product in period \( t+1 \).

- **Productivity aggregation:** 
  \[
  \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_t}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} = (1-\sigma_{t-1}) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{1+\eta \lambda} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} + \sigma_{t-1} \left( 1 + \frac{1+\eta \lambda}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}.
  \]
  where \( \hat{A}_t^N := \frac{A_t^N}{A_t^*} \) is the aggregate relative productivity of non-protected industries.

- **Unprotected productivity law of motion:** 
  \[
  \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_t}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} = \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \right] \left( 1 + \frac{1}{1+\eta \lambda} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} + \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \left( 1 + \frac{1+\eta \lambda}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}.
  \]

- **Protected industries law of motion:** 
  \[
  \hat{S}_t = \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \right] \left( 1 + \frac{1}{1+\eta \lambda} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} + \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \left( 1 + \frac{1+\eta \lambda}{1+\mu_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}.
  \]

7.6.3. Firm decisions

- **Strategic in-industry pricing:** 
  \[
  \mu_t^P = \lambda \cdot \frac{\eta \lambda}{1-(1-q)}.
  \]

- **Firm research decisions:** 
  \[
  \beta \cdot \frac{1}{1+\mu_t^P} \left( 1 + \frac{\mu_t^P}{1+\mu_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} E_t \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1} + \hat{X}_{t+1} \hat{A}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \frac{d_t^P}{\mu_{t+1}} Z_{t+1} = \hat{W}_t^W.
  \]

- **Research and appropriation payoff:** 
  \[
  G_{t+1} = (1 + \gamma Z_t L_{t+1}^R)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}.
  \]

- **Free entry of firms:** 
  \[
  \min \left\{ \hat{S}_t - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \hat{W}_t^W, L_{t+1}^R \right\} = 0.
  \]

- **Product depreciation:** 
  \[
  \delta \hat{I}_t = \delta \left( 1 - \frac{G_{t+1}}{G_{t}^{\lambda}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}
  \]

7.6.4. Inventor decisions

- **Inventor value function:** is given recursively by: 
  \[
  V_t^I = \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \hat{W}_t^W + \lambda \left\{ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \right) \frac{G_{t+1}}{G_{t}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}.
  \]

- **Free entry of inventors:** 
  \[
  \min \left\{ \hat{S}_t - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \hat{W}_t^W, L_{t+1}^R \right\} = 0.
  \]

- **Product depreciation:** 
  \[
  \delta \hat{I}_t = \delta \left( 1 - \frac{G_{t+1}}{G_{t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}.
  \]

7.6.5. Market clearing

- **Labour market clearing:** 
  \[
  I_t^S = I_t^W \left[ \hat{S}_t - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \hat{W}_t^W + \frac{G_{t+1}}{G_{t}} \right] \frac{1 + \lambda}{\frac{1+\lambda}{\lambda} + \delta_{t-1} \left( 1 \right)^{\frac{1+\lambda}{\lambda}}}
  \]

- **Goods market clearing:** 
  \[
  X_t = \hat{C}_t.
  \]

- **Total output:** 
  \[
  \hat{Y}_t^W = \hat{C}_t + I_t^W \left[ \hat{S}_t - \frac{1}{1+\delta \hat{I}_t} \Xi_{t+1} G_{t+1} A_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \hat{W}_t^W + \frac{G_{t+1}}{G_{t}} \right] \frac{1 + \lambda}{\frac{1+\lambda}{\lambda} + \delta_{t-1} \left( 1 \right)^{\frac{1+\lambda}{\lambda}}}
  \]

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7.7. Estimation results

TODO

7.8. Granger (1969) causality tests in the presence of measurement error

Here we describe two experiments, both of which reveal that Granger (1969) causality tests may point in the opposite direction to the model’s information flow, when the true leading series is subject to an additional idiosyncratic shock (“measurement error”).

In our first set up, we modelled \( x_t \) as a repeated-root AR(2) process given by \( x_t = 2\rho x_{t-1} - \rho^2 x_{t-2} + \sigma_x \epsilon_{x,t} \), with \( \epsilon_{x,t} \sim \text{NIID}(0,1) \), and \( \sigma_x \) chosen to ensure \( \text{Var} x_t = 1 \). Then we defined \( y_t = x_t + \epsilon_{y,t} \) and \( z_t = x_{t-1} + \frac{1}{100} \epsilon_{z,t} \), with \( \epsilon_{y,t}, \epsilon_{z,t} \sim \text{NIID}(0,1) \). Note that the “measurement-error” in \( y_t \) is much-larger than that in \( z_t \), but that conditional on \( \epsilon_{y,t} \), \( y_t \) contains information useful for forecasting \( z_t \), namely, \( x_t \). Here \( y_t \) is playing the role of mark-ups, and \( z_t \) is playing the role of output.

We then simulated 400 periods from this model, and ran Granger causality tests\(^6\) at one to ten lags on the pairs \((x_t, z_t)\) and \((y_t, z_t)\). As expected, at all lags \( x_t \) was found to Granger cause \( z_t \), with reverse causation only with a single lag. However, at all lags \( z_t \) was found to Granger cause \( y_t \) (again with reverse causation only with a single lag). Thus, the mere fact of adding the i.i.d. “measurement-error” \( \epsilon_{y,t} \) to \( x_t \) has reversed the direction of Granger causality. This is because \( z_t \) contains valuable information about the expectation of future \( y_t \), due to the persistence of the underlying process.

In a second experiment, we attempted to capture accurately the cross-correlation of output and mark-ups with a deterministic cycle. In particular, we instead set \( x_t = \sin \left( \frac{\pi}{10} (t + 4) \right) \), \( y_t = x_t + \epsilon_{y,t} \) and \( z_t = \sin \left( \frac{\pi}{10} t \right) + \frac{1}{100} \epsilon_{z,t} \), with \( \epsilon_{y,t}, \epsilon_{z,t} \sim \text{NIID}(0,1) \), and the interpretation of variables as before. Under this set-up, the cross correlation of \( y_t \) and \( z_t \) looks very similar to that between mark-ups and output. After simulating and running Granger causality tests as before, we found that at all lags \( x_t \) Granger causes \( z_t \) (with reverse causation only with a single lag), and that at all lags except the first \( z_t \) Granger causes \( y_t \) (with reverse causation only with a single lag). Once again then, the presence of measurement error in the leading variable is sufficient to reverse the direction of Granger causality. We conclude then that Granger causality tests are unreliable in the presence of idiosyncratic noise or measurement error.

\(^6\) Code for this was taken from Seth et al. (2010).